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Article
Self-Defense Against Robots and Drones
A. MICHAEL FROOMKIN & P. ZAK COLANGELO
Robots can pose-or can appear to pose-a threat to life, property, and privacy.
May a landowner legally shoot down a trespassingdrone? Can she hold a trespassing
autonomous car as security against damage done or further torts? Is the fear that a
drone may be operated by a paparazzo or Peeping Tom sufficient grounds to disable
or interfere with it? How hardmay you shove if the office robot rolls over your foot?
This Article addresses all those issues and one more. what rules and standards we
could put into place to make the resolution of those questions easier and fairer to all
concerned The default common-law legal rules governing each of these perceived
threats are somewhat different, although reasonableness always plays an important
role in defining legal rights and options. In certain cases-drone overflights,
autonomous cars-national,state, and even local regulations may trump the common
law. Because it is in most cases obvious that humans can use force to protect
themselves against actual physical attack, this Article concentrates on the more
interesting cases of (1) robot (and especially drone) trespass and (2) responses to
perceived threats other than physical attack by robots-notably the risk that the robot
(or drone) may be spying-perceptions which may not always be justified, but which
sometimes may nonetheless be consideredreasonablein law.
We argue that the scope ofpermissible self-help in defending one's privacy should
be quite broad There is exigency because resort to legally administered remedies
would be impracticable; and worse, the harm caused by a drone that escapes with
intrusive recordingscan be substantialand difficult to remedy after the fact. Further,it
is common for new technology to be seen as risky and dangerous until proven
otherwise. At least initially, violent self-help will seem, and often may be, reasonable
even when the privacy threat is not great-or even extant. We therefore suggest
measures to reduce uncertainties about robots, including forbidding weaponized
robots, requiring lights and other markings that would announce a robot's
capabilities, and mandating RFID chips and serial numbers that would uniquely
identify the robot 's owner.
We conclude by examining what our survey of a person 's right to defend against
robots might tell us about the currentstate of robot rights againstpeople.
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Self-Defense Against Robots and Drones
A. MICHAEL FROOMKIN* & P. ZAK COLANGELO"
I. INTRODUCTION

Deployment of robots in the air, the home, the office, and the street
inevitably means that their interactions with both property and living things
will become more common and more complex. This Article examines
when, under U.S. law, humans may use force against robots to protect
themselves, their property, and their privacy.
In the real world, where Asimov's Laws of Robotics' do not exist,
robots can pose-or can appear to pose-a threat to life, property, and
privacy. May a landowner legally shoot down a trespassing drone? Can she
hold a trespassing autonomous car as security against damage done or
further torts? Is the fear that a drone may be operated by a paparazzo or a
Peeping Tom sufficient grounds to disable or interfere with it? How hard
may you shove if the office robot rolls over your foot? This Article
addresses all those issues and one more: what rules and standards we could
put into place to make the resolution of those questions easier and fairer to
all concerned.
The default common-law legal rules governing each of these perceived
threats are somewhat different, although reasonableness always plays an
important role in defining legal rights and options. In certain cases--drone
overflights, autonomous cars-national, state, and even local criminal law
or regulations may trump the common law. Because in most cases it is
obvious that humans can use force to protect themselves against actual
physical attack, this Article concentrates on the more interesting cases of
(1) robot (and especially drone) trespass and (2) responses to perceived
Laurie Silvers & Mitchell Rubenstein Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Miami. We
would like to thank Caroline Bradley, Michael Graham, Margot Kaminski, Gregory Keating, Edward
Hasbrouk, Timothy Ravich, the participants in We Robot 2014 and in a University of Miami School of
Law faculty workshop, for their helpful comments and suggestions. Unless otherwise noted, this
Article attempts to reflect legal and technical developments up to September 15, 2015. 0 A. Michael
Froomkin & P. Zak Colangelo. All rights reserved.
The Chartwell Law Offices.
Isaac Asimov introduced the three laws ("I-A robot may not injure a human being or, through
inaction, allow a human being to come to harm. 2-A robot must obey the orders given it by human
beings except where such orders would conflict with the First Law. 3-A robot must protect its own
existence as long as such protection does not conflict with the First or Second Law.") in Runaround, a
short story originally published in the March 1942 issue of Astounding Science Fiction and
subsequently included in ISAAC ASIMOv, I ROBOT (1950).

CONNECTICUT LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1

threats other than physical attack by robots-perceptions which may not
always be justified in fact, but which sometimes may nonetheless be
considered reasonable in law.
Part II discusses common-law self-help doctrine, which states that
conduct otherwise tortious is privileged where it cures, prevents, or
mitigates a more serious tort that is, or reasonably seems to be, about to
occur. In the protection-of-person context, the issue is simple because we
value life more than property. One may destroy even expensive property in
the reasonable belief that the destruction is necessary to save one's own
life or that of another. The same general rule applies to non-life-threatening
personal injury, subject to a reasonableness test as to the relative damages.
On the other hand, one may not knowingly destroy expensive property to
protect inexpensive property. The test is one of reasonableness and
proportionality: the chattel that poses the threat may be harmed only if its
destruction is reasonably believed to be necessary and the cost of that
destruction is reasonable in light of the threat posed.
Privacy intrusions complicate the calculus. Intrusion on seclusion is a
recognized, if somewhat exotic, tort, but its rarity in the courts means that
the scope of permissible self-help against privacy-invading chattels-like
the camera planted by the landlord in the tenant's bedroom-is poorly
charted legal territory. When a privacy intrusion also involves a trespass,
the trespass rule likely defines the scope of permissible self-help. But some
robot-enhanced privacy intrusions will not involve trespass, and these are
the hardest cases.
In Part II.D, we argue that the scope of permissible self-help in
defending one's privacy should be quite broad even in the absence of a
trespass. There is exigency because resort to legally administered remedies
would be impracticable; and worse, the harm caused by a drone that
escapes with intrusive recordings can be substantial and difficult to remedy
after the fact. Further, it is common for new technology to be seen as risky
and dangerous, and until proven otherwise, drones are no exception. At
least initially, violent self-help will seem, and often may be, reasonable
even when the privacy threat is not great-or even extant. One Colorado
town has already proposed to offer drone-hunting licenses and a bounty for
those shot down.2
A limiting principle, however, is that the intrusion-on-seclusion tort
requires that the intrusion be highly offensive to a reasonable person. And
self-help is limited to what a reasonable person would think necessary.
The calculus, then, must balance the value of the interest being protected
against the value of the chattel committing the intrusion and the risk of
harm to third parties. Third-party rights could make it unreasonable to
2 See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
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shoot at or disable a drone, as the projectile or the falling drone could
injure bystanders or their property.
That calculation may ask too much. Unlike defending life or property
against a chattel, defending privacy against a chattel requires a cost-benefit
analysis that may be impossible to make in the abstract or the particular. A
person cannot reasonably be expected to know much about an intruding
drone's capabilities or intentions; hence, threat assessment, much less
balancing, is nearly impossible. Does that uncertainty justify the use of
purely precautionary self-help? In addition, the calculation demands a
value judgment about privacy and invites inquiry into what sorts of selfhelp should be permitted, rather than just whether the robot looks more
expensive than the property to be defended.
Further complicating matters, state common law can be preempted by
federal and state legislation and regulation. Part III therefore outlines
relevant state and federal law and explains how it influences parts of tort
law. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulates how low fixedwing aircraft and helicopters may lawfully fly, and similar rules for drones
are likely. These rules help define a trespass. But while height rules are
likely, federal action in the privacy arena is not. State legislation and
common-law rules will thus continue to play a fundamental role in shaping
individuals' privacy rights. Several states have passed legislation
regulating private and public drone use, often evincing a concern for
privacy rights.
Part V contains our recommendations to solve, or at least ameliorate,
seven issues we identify during our survey of current law in Parts II and
III. The seven issues can be summarized as follows:
1. Because both self-defense and defense of another person are
privileged when a mere chattel reasonably appears to present a physical
threat,3 some people may be too willing to destroy robots when they feel
threatened by them, and the law will tend to permit this.
2. Because it will be difficult for the average person to know the
capabilities of an unfamiliar robot-something essential to making good
judgments of how dangerous the robot might be-some people will
overprotect their property against damage from robots. What is more, so
long as this uncertainty about robot danger (whether as a class, or in
specific cases of ambiguously dangerous robots) is widespread, tort law
will tend to treat this overprotective behavior as "reasonable" and thus
privileged.4
3. Relatedly, the great difficulties in assessing the privacy
consequences of a robotic intrusion will also lead people to err3 See infra Part II.A.
4 See infra Part H.C.2.
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reasonably-on the side of caution and thus self-help. To the extent that
tort law recognizes a right of self-help against privacy intrusions,5 the law
will tend to privilege that conduct also. 6
4. These considerations will apply even more strongly to aerial robots
(drones): people will have significant practical difficulties in identifying
and assessing the position, actions, and capabilities of aerial robots. The
resulting uncertainty will make some property owners too willing to take
offensive action in perceived self-defense. Tort law is likely to be
solicitous of the property owner's need to make quick decisions under
uncertainty. That solicitude will not, however, extend to actions that
present an unreasonable risk of danger to third parties, such as shooting
into the air in populated areas. 7
5. There is uncertainty as to the vertical boundary of property,8
something people will need to know in order to determine when an aerial
robot is committing a legal trespass.
6. The law is unclear as to the extent of the privilege for self-help in
the face of privacy torts like intrusion on seclusion.9
7. Under tort law principles, a person's privilege to defend her property
by harming a robot reasonably perceived as dangerous will turn on the
value of the robot as much as on the value of the property being threatened.
A person can be expected to know the value of the property she is
protecting, but the law will recognize that it will be difficult for the
canonical reasonable person to make an estimate of a robot's value in a
timely manner during an emergency.' If courts attempt to rely on the
reasonably perceived value of the robot, then that creates incentives for
robot designers to make their robots look more expensive than they
actually are. Encouraging gilding of robots in order to make them resistant
to self-defense predicated on tort claims of property damage seems
undesirable."
Our proposed solutions to these problems begin with the observation
that most of them spring from some kind of uncertainty about, or relating
to, robots. We therefore suggest measures to reduce those uncertainties,
including forbidding weaponized robots, requiring lights and other
markings that would announce a robot's capabilities, creating a legal
5 See infra Part II.D.
6 See infra Part lI.D. 1-2.

1See infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
8 See infra Part II.C.2.a.
I See infra Part II.D.
10See infra Part l.B.
" Our proposals in Part IV address each of the first six issues above directly, but they do not
directly confront this seventh issue. However, by reducing the number of cases in which people
erroneously become convinced that they need to defend themselves against a robot, our proposals at
least address this issue indirectly in that it will matter less frequently.
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presumption that trespassing drones are dangerous to privacy if they do not
bear visible indicia of harmlessness, requiring drone operators to file flight
plans-either before or after the fact-if they overfly private property or
even public property in urban areas, and mandating serial numbers that
would uniquely identify the robot's owner.
Part V concludes with a brief examination of what if anything our
survey of a person's right to defend against robots might tell us about the
current state of robot rights against people.
II. SELF-HELP AGAINST ROBOTS

Robots pose a threat of physical harm to life and limb. Google's
autonomous car may run over your foot as you cross the street; Amazon's
drone may drop a package on your head. Robots also pose a physical threat
to property: the car or the package may hit your car instead of you. Robots
may trespass, violating your right to exclusive possession. Drones, like
manned aircraft, will crash, and should Google Maps provide
misinformation, their autonomous car may make a right turn onto your
front lawn. Finally, robots pose a threat to privacy. They may spy by
recording or intercepting information in situations where it would be
difficult for a human to do so.
Driverless cars present special problems, in part because they must
interact with an extensive body of primarily state law regulating on-road
operations, and both state and federal law relating to safety. Cars are
generally bigger than drones, can move faster than most drones, and tend
to operate in closer proximity to people and their property. Thus, driverless
cars, like ordinary cars,12 raise a great risk of physical harm. Privacy
concerns, on the other hand, are less severe with driverless cars than with
drones: drones can reach and remain in spaces that most cars cannot.
Trespass is probably an equally significant problem for both driverless cars
and drones.
The law must respond as technology enables new ways for individuals
and their mechanical agents to commit harms. Robots present questions
that in many cases will be answered by appeal to classic legal rules. But
robots sometimes may also require new rules or new understandings. One
might sometimes avoid the need for self-defense by reasoning with a
human who appears poised to commit a tort, 13 but that strategy may not
12 In 2012, there were 5,615,000 police-reported car crashes, 33,561 fatalities, and 2,362,000

people injured. NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., QUICK FACTS

2012, at 1 (2014), http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/812006.pdf [http://perma.cc/X6C2-CCSP].
13 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 132 (5th ed. 1984)

("Ordinarily, the use of any force at all will be unreasonable unless the intruder has first been asked to
desist. Blows are not justified where it is not clear that words alone would not be enough."). This is not
the case in the robot context. Unless the robot is remotely operated by a human, or has sophisticated
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work with a robot lacking cognition. Force will sometimes be the best
option in dealing with an out-of-control robot; even when force is not
obviously the best choice, people will sometimes resort to it nonetheless.
The law must be prepared to address these inevitable scenarios.
The law calls this use of defensive force "self-help." "Tort self-help is
14
any extrajudicial act that cures, prevents, or minimizes a tort."'
Traditionally, we distinguish between two types of self-help: simple selfhelp, in which the self-helper's actions in any event would be legal, and the
special case where the self-helper's actions are justified only because of
the danger created by the tortfeasor. In the simple case, the self-helper's
conduct requires no special legal privilege. Examples of this legally
straightforward type of self-help include staying inside at night to prevent
robbery and erecting a fence to prevent trespass. Other types of conduct
that would normally be tortious or otherwise sanctionable become legal
when justified by special circumstances such as the risk imposed by the
tortfeasor's act or omission. Deemed "coercive self-help" by Richard
Epstein, 5 these actions are permissible only because of a legal privilege. 6
We focus on self-help against the torts that mobile robots seem most
likely to commit initially, namely assault, battery, trespass, and invasions
of privacy. In the long run, as robots become more sophisticated and
autonomous, we may see robots committing conversion, libel,' 7
malpractice,' 8 or even fraud; but we leave those for another day. Inorder to
determine the extent to which people have a common-law right to defend
themselves against robots, we must begin by looking at a person's right of
self-defense against torts by other people, and then at a person's unilateral
right to harm another person's chattels when those chattels threaten people
or property. There is no category of "robot torts" because machines are not
considered to be the legal authors of their actions, just as computers are not

artificial intelligence, negotiation will not work, so the privilege of self-help should be correspondingly
broader than elsewhere.
"4Douglas Ivor Brandon et al., Self-Help: Extrajudicial Rights, Privileges and Remedies in
ContemporaryAmerican Society, 37 VAND. L. REv. 845, 852 (1984).
'5Richard A. Epstein, The Theory and Practiceof Self-Help, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 1, 3 (2005).
16A legal privilege is "conduct which, under ordinary circumstances, would subject the actor to
liability, [but] under particular circumstances does not subject him to such liability." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 10 (1965).
7 See, e.g., Andrew Beaujon, L.A. Times Reporter Talks About His Story-Writing 'Quakebot,'
POYNTER (Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.poynter.org/news/mediawire/243744/1-a-times-reporter-talksabout-his-story-writing-quakebot/ [http://perma.cc/GZ7C-Z4BF] (discussing an algorithm's being used
to create news stories).
" See, e.g., John Timmer, IBM to Set Watson Loose on Cancer Genome Data, ARs TECHNICA
(Mar. 19, 2014), http://arstechnica.com/science/2014/03/ibm-to-set-watson-loose-on-cancer-genomedata/ [http://perma.cc/WL4Z-F47D] (discussing a computer's being used to recommend medical
treatments).
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held liable for their own acts or omissions.' 9 Nevertheless, throughout this
Article we adopt that shorthand on the understanding that the law will look
behind the robot to find a person to hold liable for the robot's actions. 0
Usually a person who has been wronged is expected to go to the law

for redress. Indeed, it is common to claim that one of the hallmarks of
modem civilization is that personal revenge and vendettas have been
displaced by due process and state-controlled remedies. 2' In contrast, selfhelp is personal and extrajudicial. Nevertheless, two factors 22 justify
carving out a self-help privilege. First, the law recognizes that the judicial

remedies available may sometimes be inadequate, or self-help remedies
superior.23 Second, the law recognizes that in certain circumstances the use
of self-help will only minimally impair society's interest in law and
order.24 The law is willing to permit extrajudicial remedies of an actor's

own making where a judicial remedy is inconvenient or unavailable, and
where self-help does not strongly threaten a breach of the peace.
Common-law self-help doctrine generally boils down

to

a

reasonableness standard. In general, threats to persons may be met with

"9For an early and accurate prediction that "for the foreseeable future" computers would not be
held liable for their acts and omissions, see John F. Banzhaf I, When a Computer Needs a Lawyer, 71
DICK. L. REV. 240, 240 (1967). For a more modem account, see Neil M. Richards & William D. Smart,
How Should the Law Think About Robots?, in ROBOT LAW (M. Ryan Calo, A. Michael Froomkin & Ian
Kerr eds., forthcoming 2016). For a general discussion of how tort law might one day account for
autonomous robots, see Curtis E.A. Kamow, The Application of Traditional Tort Theory to Embodied
Machine Intelligence, in ROBOT LAW, supra.
2 There will undoubtedly be interesting issues as to which of the various parties involved in the
design, construction, programming, and operation of a robot should be held responsible for harm it
causes. Those questions, however, are beyond the scope of this Article.
23See Brandon et al., supra note 14, at 853 ("The earliest tort remedies were exclusively selfhelp. Early medieval plaintiffs, without courts on which to depend or with only a few courts of limited
jurisdiction to which they could turn, often had to seek redress directly from the tortfeasor or his
family, usually by force of arms. This ad hoc system often led to breaches of the peace and, not
uncommonly, bloodshed. Exclusive reliance on self-help also gave the strongest members of society a
disproportionate ability to recover and led to an inequitable distribution of remedial fruits. These
concerns and the desire to centralize economic and judicial power caused medieval rulers to establish a
system of courts that generally discouraged self-help, especially in the tort field. One commentator has
described the 'first business of the law, and more especially of the law of crime and tort' of fifteenth
century courts as the suppression of self-help." (footnotes omitted)).
22Other minor factors also come into play. For example, traditional ideas of the reasonableness of
instinctive human reactions also contribute to the permissive nature of the self-help privilege. See
Epstein, supra note 15, at 29 ("To ask an innocent party... to refrain from the use of force when
threatened with serious bodily harm or the substantial loss of property is to demand too much, and to
increase the chances of such aggression.").
23Brandon et al., supranote 14, at 853. Richard Epstein notes as an example that no one is forced
to pay for goods that have not been delivered. Epstein, supra note 15, at 26 ("It would be grotesque to
foreclose that option and to force the innocent party to sue in contract for expectation damages. The
innocent party gets the options.").
24See Brandon et al., supra note 14, at 853.
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proportionate counter-violence. 25 But threats to property, especially meager
threats like technical trespass, cannot in the main justify harms to
persons. z6 A property owner may defend his property only with such steps
as society views as reasonably necessary.27 In the classic common-law
cases, this meant that potentially lethal self-help was rarely allowed just to
protect against threats to property. 28 That standard has been modified by
statute.29 Thus, the key issue in mapping the scope of permissible self-help
against robots will be defining the harm posed by a tortfeasing robot: the
while
threat of limited harms justifies only limited self-help remedies,
30
great harms may justify unique and severe self-help remedies.

25 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 63(1) (1965) ("An actor is privileged to use
reasonable force, not intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily harm, to defend himself against
unprivileged harmful or offensive contact or other bodily harm which he reasonably believes that
another is about to inflict intentionally upon him.").
26See, e.g., Anderson v. Smith, 7 111.App. 354, 358 (1880) (noting that the law places "such a
transcendent value upon human life that it conclusively presumes that it is not reasonable to take the
life of a human being when the threatened injury, if consummated, would be but a mere trespass or
misdemeanor"). See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, at 133-34 ("Even the tradition that a
man's house is his castle, and that one may kill in defense of his dwelling, has given way in most
jurisdictions to the view that such force is not justified unless the intrusion threatens the personal safety
of the occupants." (footnotes omitted)); Richard A. Posner, Killing or Wounding to Protect a Property
Interest, 14 J.L. & ECON. 201 (1971).
27See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 260(1) (1965) ("[O]ne is privileged to commit an act
which would otherwise be a trespass to a chattel or a conversion if the act is, or is reasonably believed
to be, necessary to protect the actor's land or chattels or his possession of them, and the harm inflicted
is not unreasonable as compared with the harm threatened."); id.§ 263 ("One is privileged to commit
an act which would otherwise be a trespass to the chattel of another or a conversion of it, if it is or is
").
reasonably believed to be reasonable and necessary to protect the person or property of the actor ....
28 See, e.g., Bird v. Holbrook, (1828) 130 Eng. Rep. 911 (C.P.) (imposing liability on an owner
who, in order to protect his garden, left a spring gun to injure a trespasser); see also RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF TORTS § 79 (1934) (recognizing privilege to use deadly force in defense of property only
where necessary to protect the occupant from death or serious bodily harm). But see Scheuerman v.
Scharfenberg, 50 So. 335, 342 (Ala. 1909) (recognizing privilege to use potentially deadly force in
defense of business premises). The privilege to use non-deadly force, such as barbed wire, to protect
property is generally more permissible. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 84 (1934). One of the
comments to that section states that the privilege is not destroyed by the use of a device "which is likely
to do more harm than the possessor of land would be privileged to inflict if he were present at the time
of the particular intrusion." Id. cmt. e.
29See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 197 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 580 of 2015 Reg. Sess.)
("Homicide is also justifiable when... committed in defense of habitation, property, or person, against
one who manifestly intends or endeavors, by violence or surprise, to commit a felony, or against one
who manifestly intends and endeavors, in a violent, riotous or tumultuous manner, to enter the
habitation of another for the purpose of offering violence to any person therein ....");FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 782.02 (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.) ("The use of deadly force is justifiable
when a person is resisting any attempt to murder such person or to commit any felony upon him or her
or upon or in any dwelling house in which such person shall be.").
30Cf, e.g., Hummel v. State, 99 P.2d 913, 916 (Okla. Crim. App. 1940) (recognizing privilege to
castrate "mongrel bull" where it threatened to impregnate thoroughbred cattle).
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A. Robot Threats to Humans
We see both classic justifications for self-help in the paradigmatic
example of the self-help privilege. The use of violence to protect one's
bodily integrity is privileged, i.e., permitted, because judicial remedies are
not available during a melee and because society's interest in maintaining
order is not appreciably harmed. Judicial remedies are inadequate when
someone is beating you on the head because ordinarily a victim of a
physical battery does not have the luxury of time to go to court to seek an
injunction against it. Moreover, while privileging the application of force
in self-defense does risk breaching the peace, the damage has in some
sense already been done because the initial attacker breached the peace;
allowing the invocation of a self-defense privilege will not in most cases
make matters notably worse.
As a general matter, humans may only use reasonable force against
others to protect themselves from physical harm, including both assault
and battery.3 When humans are endangered by property, the quantum of
force permitted against that property is more expansive than when a person
is threatening the harm,3" but it still is not unlimited.33 One may destroy
even expensive property in the reasonable belief that the destruction is
necessary to save one's own life or that of another.34 The same general rule
applies to defense against non-life-threatening personal injury (battery) and
the reasonable apprehension of physical injury (assault), subject to a
reasonableness test as to the relative damages.35
3' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 63-66 (1965); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §§ 6366 (1934).
12 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Baker, 74 Pa. D & C.2d 595, 600 (Com. P1. 1975) ("The person
under attack will not be held to the same standard of judgment in shooting a dog as he would be in
shooting a human, even in self-defense.").
3 Thus, an individual is not privileged to destroy a Rembrandt in order to prevent a mere bump
on the toe. This follows from the general reasonableness standard: the threat (bump on the toe) must be
of the sort that requires immediate action. And the action (destruction) must be reasonable in light of
both the harm it will cause (value of Rembrandt) and the harm it will prevent (bump on toe). Where a
reasonable person would take the bump on the toe rather than destroy the property, the law will not
allow the unreasonable behavior; consequently, the person attached to the toe must pay for the
Rembrandt if she harms it. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, at 136 ("The conduct of the defendant in
preventing the harm would be unreasonable if a reasonable person would not so act because the
magnitude of the harm that would likely result from the action outweighed the benefits of the action.").
14 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 261 (1934) ("One is privileged to use or otherwise
intentionally intermeddle with a chattel in the possession of another for the purpose of defending
himself or a third person .... ").
31 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 63 (1965) ("An actor is privileged to use reasonable
force, not intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily harm, to defend himself against
unprivileged harmful or offensive contact or other bodily harm which he reasonably believes that
another is about to inflict intentionally upon him."); id. § 261 ("One is privileged to commit an act
which would otherwise be a trespass to or a conversion of a chattel in the possession of another, for the
purpose of defending himself or a third person against the other, under the same conditions which
would afford a privilege to inflict a harmful or offensive contact upon the other for the same purpose.").
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At present under the law of all U.S. jurisdictions, all robots, no matter
how clever or autonomous,3 6 are property.37 Thus, under these standard tort
principles, in any case in which a robot reasonably appears to threaten
human life or even threatens to commit serious bodily injury, not only the
potential victim, but also third parties, will be justified in destroying the
offending robot. At the same time, the overarching reasonableness standard
means that people will not be justified in destroying a robot that appears to
be threatening a person if the self-helper knew or should have known that
the apparent victim was not in fact in danger, or if the self-helper knew or
should have known of a feasible and less destructive means of preventing
the human injury. But even here the law makes allowances for the pressure
imposed by the need for split-second judgments, and thus does not require
perfect decisionmaking from potential victims or rescuers in
emergencies.38
In light of the newness of robotic technology, an alternate legal theory
for drone-operator liability, and perhaps for robot-operator liability more
generally, would be a strict-liability regime on the grounds that robot use
in public is an ultrahazardous activity. Ultrahazardous activities-like
using dynamite in construction or keeping wild animals as pets-are
subject to strict liability39 to ensure that such activities are undertaken with
all appropriate precautions. The very dangerousness of an ultrahazardous
activity means that self-defense against its harmful consequences will
usually be privileged.4" For example, when airplanes were new and
experimental, their use was considered an ultrahazardous activity and was
subject to a strict-liability regime.4 1 The rationale was that airplanes were
36 See Richards & Smart, supra note 19.

3 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes suggested that "property" is anything for which there exists a
market, i.e., anything treated as property over an extended period of time. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The
Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 476-77 (1897).
" See, e.g., Anderson v. Smith, 7 I11.
App. 354, 360-61 (1880) ("We use the words apparent
danger because we do not consider that real danger is indispensable in defense of property, any more
than it is in defense of person. In either case a party must judge of and act from the appearances."); see
also KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, at 125 ("The privilege to act in self-defense arises, not only where
there is real danger, but also where there is a reasonable belief that it exists.").
39Strict liability imposes liability even absent negligence or intent to harm. In that way it imposes
an absolute duty to not cause harm.
o This again follows from the general reasonableness standard because the harm threatened by
ultrahazardous activities is so severe.
41See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. g (1938) ("[A]viation has not as yet become
either a common or an essential means of transportation. This, coupled with the fact that as yet
aeroplanes have not been so perfected as to make them subject to a certainty of control approximating
that of which automobiles are capable, and with the serious character of harm which an aeroplane out
of control is likely to do to persons, structures or chattels on the land over which it flies make it proper
to regard aviation as an ultrahazardous activity. Furthermore, a perfect plane perfectly flown may crash
in unfavorable weather conditions."); P.F. Doherty, Torts in Aeronautical Navigation, 19 TEMP. L.Q.
496, 496 (1946) (noting that at the end of 1945, eighteen states had laws "provid[ing] that the owner
and/or operator of every aircraft which is operated over land or water of the state is absolutely liable for
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(1) dangerous and (2) uncommon.42 In that way, airplanes were distinct
from automobiles, which while perhaps more deadly were significantly
more common. Unarmed robots, including drones, are probably not as
dangerous as manned aircraft were in the early twentieth century, and
whether drones are as dangerous as a wild animal kept as a pet will
probably depend on the characteristics of the individual robot. Thus it is
not clear that the operation of the ordinary robot-or even the ordinary
drone that is capable of falling out of the sky-will qualify as an
ultrahazardous activity. Robots are still somewhat uncommon-although
the impetus for this Article is the prediction that robots will soon become
common. Therefore, although it is possible that courts might treat the
operation of robots with the capability to hurt people as an ultrahazardous
activity for an introductory period, we would not expect that period to last
long, at least with regard to robots that do not carry anti-personnel
weapons. Remotely controlled drones outfitted with guns or Tasers might
well be considered ultrahazardous, especially if there is any risk that they
might be hacked, hijacked, or malfunction. Semi-autonomous weaponized
robots could easily qualify as ultrahazardous, and fully autonomous armed
robots would be considered even more dangerous.
Autonomous cars could be considered ultrahazardous. 3 But some of
the very aspects that make driverless cars, and cars in general, dangerous,
may reduce a victim's ability to use self-help. Cars are big and heavy. That
means it would be harder to use self-help against a driverless car than
against a drone, and much more difficult to do so safely under the
circumstances. If the car is moving at significant speed, any attempt to
disable it risks harm to other cars, property, or bystanders, not to mention
injury to persons or property on the land or water beneath.., whether such owner was negligent or
not"); Timothy M. Ravich, The Integration of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles into the National Airspace,
85 N.D. L. REv. 597, 603 (2009) ("[A]n early view of aviation-whether by balloon or by something
else-[was] an ultrahazardous activity."); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520A (1977)
("If physical harm to land or to persons or chattels on the ground is caused by the ascent, descent or
flight of aircraft, or by the dropping or falling of an object from the aircraft, (a) the operator of the
aircraft is subject to liability for the harm, even though he has exercised the utmost care to prevent it,
and (b) the owner of the aircraft is subject to similar liability if he has authorized or permitted the
operation.").
42 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977) ("In determining whether an activity is

abnormally dangerous, the following factors are to be considered: (a) existence of a high degree of risk
of some harm to the person, land or chattels of others; (b) likelihood that the harm that results from it
will be great; (c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care; (d) extent to which
the activity is not a matter of common usage; (e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it
is carried on; and (f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous
attributes."); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 520 (1938) ("An activity is ultrahazardous if it (a)
necessarily involves a risk of serious harm to the person, land or chattels of others which cannot be
eliminated by the exercise of the utmost care, and (b) is not a matter of common usage.").
"3See, e.g., F. Patrick Hubbard, "SophisticatedRobots": Balancing Liability, Regulation, and
Innovation, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1803, 1834, 1862-63 (2014).

CONNECTICUTLA WREVIEW

[Vol. 48:1

harm to any occupants of the vehicle.' The physical danger from effective
self-help against a moving driverless car can be great, but so too can the
physical harm that that car may cause. As a result, the balancing of
probable harms required by tort law's reasonableness standard will in most
cases have weights on both sides.
Self-help against driverless cars is also less likely than against drones
because the public fears drones much more than driverless cars-almost
half of those surveyed by the Pew Research Center stated that they would
ride in a driverless car if given the opportunity.4 5 The lack of fear of
driverless cars may stem from a general familiarity with automobiles.
Whatever its source, the public's lack of concern suggests that people are
less likely to feel compelled to engage in self-help against a driverless car,
at least until its physical threat is very obvious.
B. Robot Threats to Property
In contrast to when a person is threatened, in which case even
expensive property can be destroyed to save life and limb, one may not in
general destroy expensive property to protect inexpensive property. 46 The
test is one of reasonableness layered over cost-benefit: the chattel that
poses the threat may be interfered with only if the expected cost of that
interference is "reasonably believed to be[] necessary to protect the actor's
land or chattels or his possession of them, and the harm inflicted is not
unreasonable as compared with the harm threatened. 47
In most cases it would be unreasonable for a person to knowingly
destroy expensive property to protect inexpensive property. It follows that
a person's right to self-help will be greater against an inexpensive-looking
robot threatening property damage than against an expensive-looking robot
threatening the same damage. 48 The difficulty, however, is that this
distinction depends on the property-owner having some sense of what the
relative value of the robot is. The courts long ago decided that
'4 5 Drones, being unmanned by definition, have no occupants.

AARON SMITH, PEW RESEARCH CTR., U.S. VIEWS OF TECHNOLOGY AND THE FUTURE: SCIENCE

IN THE NEXT 50 YEARS,

at 4

(2014), http://www.pewintemet.org/files/2014/04/US-Views-of-

Technology-and-the-Future.pdf [http://perma.cc/DX29-A4CX].
46 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 260 (1965) ("[O]ne is privileged to commit an act
which would otherwise be a trespass to a chattel or a conversion if the act is, or is reasonably believed
to be, necessary to protect the actor's land or chattels or his possession of them, and the harm inflicted
is not unreasonableas compared with the harm threatened." (emphasis added)).
" Id.; see also, e.g., Nesbett v. Wilbur, 58 N.E. 586, 586 (Mass. 1900) (holding that whether a

self-helper is justified in defending her property depends "upon a number of variable facts[]-the
imminence and nature of the danger threatened, the kind of property in peril, from whom or what the
danger proceeds, the relative importance of the harm threatened, and that which is done in defense").
48 Cf KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, at 136 ("The conduct of the defendant in preventing the
harm would be unreasonable if a reasonable person would not so act because the magnitude of the harm
that would likely result from the action outweighed the benefits of the action.").
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decisionmaking under stress need not be perfect. As one court put it, if a
chicken-owner was privileged to shoot a hungry trespassing dog only if the
value of the property he protects is in fact greater than the value of the dog,
then "a keeper of poultry might lose his entire flock of chickens while
endeavoring to ascertain whether the attacking dog [is] worth more than
the chickens, and thus be deprived of the right, which the law has given
him from the earliest49times, to defend his property against the unlawful
acts of man or beast."
That expensive robots enjoy more protection than inexpensive ones
may create perverse incentives for drone owners and operators: apparently
one can increase the protection enjoyed by one's robot by making it look
more expensive than it actually is.
C. Robot Trespass
We turn now to the more complicated cases of robot (and especially
drone) trespass.
1. Trespass in General
A trespass is an intentional entry onto an owner's land or property
without her permission.5" While trespass is technically an intentional tort,
because it requires the element of intent to do the act that constituted the
trespass, it operates, for all practical purposes, as a strict-liability tort. This
means that defendants are liable even in the absence of any negligence on
their part.51 Thus, trespass is actionable even when unknowing. To commit
a trespass, one need only intend to enter the land. The trespasser, however,
may be liable even absent knowledge that the property is owned by
another. Furthermore, unlike most other torts where plaintiffs must have
and prove actual damages in order to have a viable claim, the trespass
plaintiff does not need to prove actual damages to the property. As a
formal matter, although not so much in practice, the simple violation of the
exclusive possession is harm enough in and of itself
technical legal right 5to
2
to establish liability.
Unlike in cases of actual physical harm-where damage includes a
"9Johnston v. Wilson, 123 S.E. 222, 224 (Ga. Ct. App. 1924).
'0 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 50 (2012); RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (1965).
"' RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 50 (2012); RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (1965).
52 Trespass protects the right of exclusive possession, not merely the tangible property itself.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 50 (2012) ("A trespasser is a person who
enters or remains on land in the possession of another without the possessor's consent or other legal
privilege."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (1965) ("One [may be] subject to liability to
another for trespass, irrespective of whether he thereby causes harm to any legally protected interest of
the other ...").
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physical element that is calculable, monetizable, and thus susceptible to
cost-benefit analysis-the less-tangible harm to technical legal rights in
cases of technical trespass does not lend itself to straightforward costbenefit balancing. The simplest case is when the trespass has caused only
nominal damages-for instance, grass that has been trodden down. If the
damage is small, it follows that the self-help reprisal must be small too, or
else it exceeds the privilege. 3
Tort law recognizes as actionable trespasses by chattels when an
individual causes a chattel to enter or remain on land in the possession of
another without permission.5 4 So when unwanted inanimate chattels such
as cars 55 or construction equipment 56 come to rest on a landowner's
property, the general rule is that the landowner is entitled to remove the
trespassing chattels, but may take only such steps as are reasonably
necessary to effect the removal.5 7 The privilege to interfere with another's
chattel is narrow here because it is triggered by a relatively insignificant
harm. Furthermore, if the chattel's intrusion is by invitation or contractfor example, a delivery drone entering the customer's property-the
permission to enter makes the chattel effectively an invitee, and not a
trespasser.5 8
Special rules in animal cases add an additional wrinkle: if the
landowner is willing to give the animals proper care, she does not have to
remove them. Instead she may seize them and bill their owner for the
nominal damages from the trespass and the costs of caring for the animals
(in part because the seizure prevents additional damage to the property or
vegetation). 9 Often granted today by "estray ' 6 ° statutes,6" the right to
53 Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 260 (1965) ("[T]he harm inflicted [must not be]
unreasonable as compared with the harm threatened.").
5 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (1965).
" E.g., Rossi v. Ventresca Bros. Constr. Co., 405 N.Y.S.2d 375, 376 (Civ. Ct. 1978); Reed v.
Esplanade Gardens, Inc., 398 N.Y.S.2d 929, 930 (Civ. Ct. 1977).
56E.g., Melbourne Bros. Constr. Co. v. Pioneer Co., 384 S.E.2d 857, 860 (W. Va. 1989); Sears v.
Summit, Inc., 616 P.2d 765, 766 (Wyo. 1980).
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 260 (1965); see also Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Joullian,
76 So. 769, 770 (Miss. 1917) (holding appellant railroad company liable for damages where it
destroyed two boats owned by plaintiff that had drifted from his dock during a storm and finding that
such behavior was "unnecessary force" since "there was time for the railway company to employ the
services of those who knew how to... remove the boat from the right of way, or to permit the plaintiff
to do the work for himself'); Grier v. Ward, 23 Ga. 145, 148 (1857) (holding that the landowner could
remove, without causing unnecessary injury, cotton placed on his property without his authorization,
and stating in dicta that the cotton-owner might be able to recover for damage to the cotton).
" A very popular sales company like Amazon might make granting of overflight privileges a part
of its standard-form contract. How long such a term could be effective as a consequence of a one-time
sale is a consumer-law question beyond the scope of this Article. It seems likely, however, that such a
term could be valid as part of a continuing relationship like Amazon Prime.
" Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta
County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623, 665-66 (1986). Ellickson also notes, however, that "even ranchers who
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capture and hold as security trespassing animals derives from the ancient
62
legal remedy of distraint damage feasant or distress damage feasant.
Despite this privilege of self-help, the landowner is generally not
privileged to wound or kill the trespassing animals. 63 As elsewhere in tort
law, all these principles are subject to a reasonableness standard.
2. Trespass by Robots
The animal cases pose interesting possibilities for instances of robot
trespass. Some scholars equate the moral claims of autonomous robots
with those of animals, and others suggest that animal law provides a useful

know that they are legally entitled to recover feeding costs virtually never seek monetary compensation
for boarding estrays." Id.at 674.
6 "The term 'estrays' at common law had the well-defined meaning of animals found wandering
at large, whose ownership was unknown." Yracebum v. Cape, 212 P. 938, 940 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1923). For a modem statutory definition, see CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 17001.5 (West, Westlaw
through Ch. 132 of 2015 Reg. Sess.) ("For the purpose of this chapter, 'estray' means any impounded
or seized bovine animal, horse, mule, sheep, swine, or burro whose owner is unknown or cannot be
located.").
61 See, e.g., CAL. FOOD & AGRiC. CODE § 17041 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 132 of 2015 Reg.
Sess.).
62 See Kelly v. Easton, 207 P. 129, 130 (Idaho 1922) ("This right [to seize and detain trespassing
animals] existed at common law and was not introduced by statute, but the matter is now regulated by
statutory enactments in the several states, providing for the seizure and impounding of cattle taken
damage feasant, and for their sale." (emphasis added) (citation omitted)). Distress, generally, Was
defined at common law as,
[T]he taking, either with legal process, or extra-judicially subject to the performance
of some necessary condition precedent, by a private individual or by an officer of
the court, of a personal chattel, out of the possession of a wrongdoer or defaulter and
into the custody of the law to be impounded as a pledge in order to bring pressure to
bear upon the owner of the chattel to redress an injury, to perform a duty, or to
satisfy a lawful demand, subject, however, to the right of the owner to have the
chattel returned to him [up]on the injury being redressed, the duty performed, or the
demand satisfied or [up]on security being given so to do.
F.A. ENEVER, HISTORY OF THE LAW OF DISTRESS FOR RENT AND DAMAGE FEASANT 7-8 (1931). The

right of distress damagefeasantis described by Blackstone as follows:
A man is answerable for not only his own trespass, but that of his cattle also;
for if by his negligent keeping they stray upon the land of another, (and much more
if he permits, or drives them on,) and they there tread down his neighbor's herbage,
and spoil his com or his trees, this is a trespass for which the owner must answer in
damages. And the law gives the party injured a double remedy in this case; by
permitting him to distrain the cattle thus damage-feasant, or doing damage, till the
owner shall make him satisfaction, or else by leaving him to the common remedy in
foro contentioso, by action.
3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 211 (1768); see also Kelly, 207 P. at 130 (quoting
Blackstone's description with approval); Hall v. Marshall, 27 P.2d 193, 195 (Or. 1933) (quoting
Blackstone's description with approval).
63See Ellickson, supra note 59, at 666 & n. 115 (surveying cases to that effect).
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model for robot law. 6 Though animals are technically chattels, the animal
65
cases show a greater solicitude for life, non-human though it may be.
Were courts to decide that robots are more like animals than inanimate
chattels, then the privilege to use violent self-help measures would be
narrower. Until that day, however, the law will treat robots as chattels. The
self-help rights of persons who are, or believe themselves to be, threatened
by robots will be analyzed under the tort rules developed for torts
committed by or with chattels.66
So long as the law treats a robot as an extension of the person that is
legally responsible for its actions, we might say that the natural person or
corporation responsible for the robot is directly responsible for what it
does, or vicariously liable for the robot's actions. In the vicarious-liability
scenario, the responsible party has a non-delegable duty to third parties to
ensure that the robot is no more dangerous than it would be if a reasonable
natural person were performing the same acts. Thus, for example, the
operator 67 of an autonomous car would have the same duty to other drivers,
pedestrians, and owners of property adjoining public streets that it would
owe if the operator6 8 were personally driving the car, and the operator must
ensure that its autonomous car discharges that duty. A simpler formulation,
which we adopt in what follows, is to say that robots are always agents of
their owners acting within the scope of their agency. This approach leaves
open the scope of liability of the robot and its operator for the underlying
torts, a subject we address below.69
In principle, victims of actionable trespass have a privilege of selfhelp.7" Self-help ranges from stopping the invader71 to damaging or even

I

See, e.g., Kate Darling, Extending Legal Protection to Social Robots: The Effects of
Anthropomorphism, Empathy, and Violent Behavior Towards Robotic Objects, in ROBOT LAW, supra
note 19; F. Patrick Hubbard, "Do Androids Dream? ": Personhoodand Intelligent Artifacts, 83 TEMP.
L. REv. 405, 417 (2011); Mark Coeckelbergh, Robot Rights? Towards a Social-RelationalJustification
of Moral Consideration,12 ETHics & INTO. TECH. 209, 210 (2010).
65 See, e.g., Bruister v. Haney, 102 So. 2d 806, 808 (Miss. 1958) (upholding punitive-damage

award against trespass victim who poisoned trespassing cattle); Strong v. Ga. Ry. & Elec. Co., 45 S.E.
366, 366-68 (Ga. 1903) (per curiam) (Cobb, J. concurring) (eulogizing deceased dog).
' The distraint remedy is not limited to the animal context. See Sears v. Summit, Inc., 616 P.2d
765, 769-70 (Wyo. 1980) (recognizing the privilege to seize construction equipment that causes
damage, but finding it excessive on facts of case because equipment caused little damage).
67 We leave for another day the question of whether the relevant "operator" is the supplier of the
autonomous vehicle or the owner or the person riding inside it, formerly known as the "driver."
" If the legally responsible party is the supplier, likely a corporation, one would have to imagine
it as if it were a natural person driving the car. For discussion of the possibilities for apportioning
liability, see generally Jeffrey K. Gumey, Sue My Car Not Me: Products Liability and Accidents
Involving Autonomous Vehicles, 2013 U. ILL J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 247 (2013); Kevin Funkhouser, Note,
Paving the Road Ahead: Autonomous Vehicles, Products Liability, and the Need for a New Approach,
2013 UTAH L. REv. 437, 440 (2013); Hubbard, supranote 43.
69 The authors are grateful to Gregory Keating for pointing out the issues discussed in this

paragraph.
'0 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 260 (1965).
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destroying it7 2 if there appears to be no other way to stop it. If the robotic
invader is an airborne drone, this privilege may extend to shooting it
down.73 In 2013, the Congressional Research Service found "no cases
where a landowner was permitted to use force to prevent or remove an
aircraft from his property."74 But that is what one would expect in a world
where aircraft are manned-no one should be able to risk a life to protect
property.75 An unmanned drone will not enjoy this blanket legal
76
protection.
In addition to destroying the robotic invader by some means, some sort
of distraint remedy,7 7 i.e., capture and security, might also be available
where the damages done, or reasonably believed to have been done, appear
to be at least equal to the value of the trespassing robot. In the case of an
airborne drone, even if the infringement of airspace does not alone justify
the distraint remedy, the drone may cause property damage after being
forced down; that additional harm is also charged to the tortfeasor's
account because it is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the
trespass.78 If the robot appears substantially more valuable than the
nominal damage it has done, the victim of the trespass likely cannot hold
79
the robot.
Weighing against the right to shoot down a drone are the risks entailed
with shooting or attempting to disable an airborne vehicle. The risks of
firing a gun into the air are obvious, as are the risks of causing a drone-

7' E.g., Rossi v. Ventresca Bros. Constr. Co., 405 N.Y.S.2d 375, 377 (City Ct. 1978) (stopping
trespass by car by towing it).
72 E.g., Forster v. Juniata Bridge Co., 16 Pa. 393, 399 (1851) (holding that while landowner was
not justified in appropriating bridge cast onto his land by storm, he would have been privileged to cast
the bridge back into the river).
" Shooting down a drone with a projectile is not the only way to disable a drone or engage in
self-help against one---one might also use a jammer, or an electromagnetic pulse, or simply cast a net
over the drone.
74 ALISSA M. DOLAN & RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., INTEGRATION OF
DRONES INTO DOMESTIC AIRSPACE: SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES 29 (2013), https://www.fas.org/sgp/
crs/natsec/R42940.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZY8Z-9MV7].
71See sources cited supranote 26.
76 See sources cited supra note 42 (defining "abnormally dangerous" and "ultrahazardous"
activities for the purpose of tort law).
17 See supranote 62 and accompanying text.
7' The general principle is that once a party commits an initial tort (here, trespass), that party is
also liable for all damages proximately caused by that harm-often including any damages suffered by
(and even reasonable ones caused by) those responding to the initial trespass. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 435A (1965) ("A person who commits a tort against another for the purpose of
causing a particular harm to the other is liable for such harm if it results, whether or not it is expectable,
except where the harm results from an outside force the risk of which is not increased by the
defendant's act."). Here, the initial trespass would have increased the risk of outside harm in the form
of reactive self-help.
" See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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which may be rather large-to fall from the sky. 80 Tort law's ubiquitous
reasonableness standard would demand that a self-helper recognize these
foreseeable risks and account for them in her cost-benefit analysis before
allowing a self-defense privilege. 8 1 The calculus will thus be very different
on an open tract of land, where there is no one else to hurt, than it would be
in a crowded community.
Lobbing a projectile in the air in the hopes of shooting down a drone is
not the only form of self-help potentially available to landowners. Both
passive and targeted jamming may be a technologically effective-if not
always legal 8 --counter-measure as well. One could imagine that mansions
of the future will have electronic as well as physical walls surrounding
their estates, with the electronic wall designed to jam control signals being
used to guide overflying drones. While it is tempting to analogize the
electronic wall to a physical wall, there are at least four important
differences between the two. First, a physical wall is much easier to see,
and thus avoid, than an electronic wall.83 Second, any signal that extends to
the property line has a substantial risk of bleeding outside, but jamming
robots or drones outside the property will almost always be unjustified
because there is no actual trespass, not to mention that jamming will
violate FCC rules.84 Many forms of surveillance from off-site, such as

80 See, e.g., J. David Goodman, Remote-Controlled Model HelicopterFatally Strikes Its Operator
at a Brooklyn Park, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/nyregion/remotecontrolled-copter-fatally-strikes-pilot-at-park.html?smid=pl-share& r= I&; Joe Sutton, 2 Injured when
Drone Malfunctions, Crashes into Navy Ship, CNN (Nov. 17, 2013, 10:37 AM), http://www.cnn.com/
2013/11/17/us/drone-malfunction-duplicate-2/ [http://perma.cc/DVP4-MK8A].
"I The implications of this rule can be seen from the following example: Homeowner shoots a
drone in a populated area. Homeowner is a good shot and hit the drone and no one is injured when it
crashes. Homeowner's action was unreasonable but it ended well. Nevertheless, Homeowner's action
was not privileged because there never existed a privilege of self-help, as a reasonable person would
not have taken the shot. Any other rule would reward and thus encourage attempts at unreasonable selfhelp even when it threatened public safety.
82 Even if justified under some theory of self-help, hacking into a robot or drone, see, e.g., Katia
Moskvitch, Are Drones the Next Target for Hackers?, BBC (Feb. 6, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/
future/story/20140206-can-drones-be-hacked
[http://perma.cc/FMS7-8QNV]
(discussing
the
vulnerabilities of drones and possible ways of hacking them, including "[j]amming" and "spoofiing]"
signals), is probably a criminal violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012), which imposes punishment on
"[w]hoever ... intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access,
and thereby obtains... information from any protected computer."
83 Deploying the electronic wall might impose some duty of notice on the landowner.
Federal law prohibits the operation, marketing, or sale of any type of jamming equipment,
including devices that interfere with cellular and Personal Communication Services (PCS), Global
Positioning Systems (GPS), and wireless networking services (Wi-Fi). See 47 C.F.R. § 2.803 (2008)
(prohibiting the importation, marketing, sale, or operation of these devices within the United States);
Consumer Alert: Using or Importing Jammers Is Illegal, FED. COMM. COMMISSION, https://
www.fcc.gov/document/consumer-alert-using-or-importing-jammers-illegal
[https://perma.cc/B6HALUCV] (last visited Oct. 11, 2015).
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photography, are also protected by the First Amendment. 85 Third, any
jamming signal that reaches to or near the top of the vertical curtilage is
highly likely to extend above it into FAA-regulated airspace, thereby
violating federal law.86 Fourth, a signal that blocks transmissions to or

from the device's controller will not deter a robot or drone that is
proceeding

autonomously

or

acting

according

to

pre-programmed

instructions.
Rather than resorting to an electronic wall, property owners might
instead opt for hand-held or automated devices that aim at trespassing
robots or drones. Targeted jamming could take many forms, some of which
will seek only to degrade certain robot or drone functions instead of trying
to disable the device, with all the attendant risks that it might damage

something. One might, for example, aim a laser at a drone in hopes of
blinding any camera it might carry. Pointing lasers at manned aircraft is
very dangerous because it can blind the pilot and frequently leads to
imprisonment.87 Pointing a laser at a robot might damage a digital

camera's sensors.8 8 Even if not a criminal act of property destruction, this
damage would be tortious unless justified as self-help--a determination
that would turn on many factors, including the camera-carrying device's

exact location and what it was, or appeared to be, doing there. Another
possibility, albeit an illegal one, 89 is Global Positioning System (GPS)
"spoofing," in which false GPS signals are sent in hopes of fooling the

intruder as to its position and thus forcing it to erroneously "correct" its
heading.9"

No account of possible drone counter-measures would be complete

" See Margot E. Kaminski, Drone Federalism: Civilian Drones and the Things They Carry, 4
CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT 57, 62-63 (2013) ("A First Amendment right to record is most likely to
outweigh privacy concerns in a public space, where one person's privacy collides with other peoples'
experience and memory.").
86See 18 U.S.C. § 32(a)(5) (2012) (imposing criminal penalties on anyone who "interferes with or
disables, with intent to endanger the safety of any person or with a reckless disregard for the safety of
human life, anyone engaged in the authorized operation of such aircraft or any air navigation facility
aiding in the navigation of any such aircraft"); sources cited supra note 84 (relating to FCC rules
against jamming GPS and other signals).
87 See Sentences for Persons Convicted of Laser Offenses, LASERPOINTERSAFETY.COM,
http://www.laserpointersafety.com/sentences/sentences.html [http://perma.cc/A25B-D6PH] (last visited
June 27, 2015) (reporting cases of individuals convicted of offenses involving laser pointers).
88See Laser Effects on Cameras and Cameorders, LASERPOINTERSAFETY.COM, http://www.laser
pointersafety.com/styled-6/ilda.html [http://penna.cc/2RXM-BHL3] (last visited June 27, 2015)
(detailing the effects of lasers on recording devices, safety concerns, and possible damage as a result of
lasers striking lenses).
89See sources cited supra note 84.
9 See David Brancaccio, Forget GPS Jamming,Drone "Spooflng'IsAll the Rage, MARKETPLACE
TECH (Mar. 11,2013), http://www.marketplace.org/topics/tech/forget-gps-jamming-drone-spoofing-allrage [http://perma.cc/8ZTE-KWF8] (describing an experiment that exposed the problem of mimicking
a drone's GPS signal to disrupt its flight instructions).
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without mentioning the "Rapere," a drone "optimized for one single
purpose: finding nearby drones and causing them to crash."9 1 As of now,
perhaps fortunately, this product is still on the drawing board, and it is
unclear if, should it ever become commercialized, the Rapere would be
offered to the public or only to those able to demonstrate a legitimate need
for its use. 92
Determining the scope of permissible self-help will always be
complicated by the difficulty victims have in trying to ascertain what the
invading robot is doing. That difficulty is particularly acute when the robot
is airborne, for it will be harder to examine it due to distance, speed, and
(at night) lighting conditions. So long as drones are an experimental
technology, this uncertainty likely will be found to justify more self-help.
As drones become more common, and presuming it becomes routine to see
them being operated in a safe manner, the calculus will likely shift. In the
short term, however, we may see courts in rural areas finding a privilege to
shoot down a trespassing drone because it will rarely, if ever, be clear that
a drone's overflight is no more than a purely technical trespass: if nothing
else, the drone's very existence in the airspace above persons and property
poses a theoretical threat of a crash.93 As discussed further below, both air
and ground robots also might be used to spy. At least until some standards
take shape, the victim of a trespass may be entitled to assume the worst,
e.g., that the robot is not merely trespassing but is recording. If one is
entitled to assume the worst, then in the absence of persuasive notice that
the robot is harmless, the victim of robotic trespass frequently will be
privileged to employ violent self-help.94
Before landowners start reaching for their shotguns, however, they
should be aware that current trespass law creates at least three substantial
obstacles for landowners seeking legal justification for self-help against
overflying drones. The first, and more substantial, difficulty lies in charting
the boundaries of private airspace-the space over which a landowner can
claim the absolute possessory right that is a prerequisite to a trespass claim;
this turns out to be a complex issue involving both state and federal law.
11Evan Ackerman, Rapere: An Intercept Drone to Seek and Destroy Other Drones, IEEE
SPECTRUM (Jan. 14, 2015), http://spectrum.ieee.orglautomaton/robotics/aerial-robots/rapere-interceptdrone [http://perma.cc/4HZN-DMXP].
92Id.
" See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 80 (reporting that a remote-controlled helicopter killed a man
when it struck him in the head); Sutton, supra note 80 (reporting that two sailors were injured by a
drone). A somewhat similar case of ever-present risk of greater-than-nominal harm applies in animal
cases. Robert C. Ellickson notes that "[b]ecause cattle eat almost incessantly, a trespass victim's
vegetation is always at risk." Ellickson, supranote 59, at 658. Further, trespass by a non-thoroughbred
bull into the vicinity of thoroughbred female cattle, while merely a technical trespass in the absence of
actual damages, poses the more serious risk of impregnation and production of offspring of an
undesired pedigree. See id
94See supratext accompanying notes 70-76.
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Landowners will need to know how federal and state law interact to shape
their air rights and how those air rights affect their privilege of self-help.
A second issue is that in practice some courts are unfriendly to claims
of technical trespass and tend to require actual harm before allowing an
aerial trespass claim. In these jurisdictions, it may be fair to ask if technical
trespass actions exist at all, or whether instead the courts have in practice
converted them into nuisance claims, which, unlike trespass claims, require
actual harm. 95
A third issue is that, even where tort law, standing alone, might find
that a privilege of self-help exists, there is no privilege to commit a
criminal act. Issues of criminal liability are beyond the scope of this
Article. News reports of recent armed-citizen versus drone interactions
suggest that law enforcement tends to arrest, or at least blame, people who
discharge firearms when defending against a drone.96 On the other hand, it
is not clear that this necessarily leads to formal charges; and even where
charges are brought, it is not clear that they will succeed.97
a. Defining Private Airspace
The starting point for determining what constitutes an aerial trespass is
determining the extent of the airspace covered by a landowner's right to
exclude others. The ancient rule gave a landowner rights all the way to the
moon, 98 but that rule has long been abrogated to allow modem air travel. 99
Yet a landowner still has exclusive rights to some of the airspace over her
95 See

infra Part II.C.2.b (discussing whether the law should require actual harm as an element).
9' See, e.g., Cyrus Farivar, Kentucky Man Shoots Down Drone Hovering over His Backyard, ARs
TECHNICA (July 29, 2015), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/07/kentucky-man-shoots-downdrone-hovering-over-his-backyard/ [http://perma.cc/7HYQ-VQTR]; Michael Martinez, HandgunFiring Drone Appears Legal in Video, but FAA, Police Probe Further, CNN (July 21, 2015),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/21/us/gun-drone-connecticut/ [http://perma.cc/XLG5-FU3Z]; Gregory S.
McNeal, Thankfully, Shooting Down a Drone Will Land You in Federal Prison, FORBEs (Dec. 10,
2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/gregorymcneal/2013/12/10/thankfully-shooting-down-a-dronewill-land-you-in-federal-prison!; Bruce Schneier, Is It OK to Shoot Down a Drone over Your
Backyard?, CNN (Sept. 9, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/09/opinions/schneier-shoot-downdrones/ [http://perma.cc/H7T7-MB5A]; John Seibler, Is It Legal to Shoot Down a Drone Hovering over
Your Property?, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 15, 2015), http://www.newsweek.com/it-legal-shoot-down-dronehovering-over-your-property-362878 [http://perna.cc/RP3 W-ASBM].
" The privilege to defend one's thoroughbred livestock supplied an affirmative defense, at least
once, to the criminal charge of malicious mischief. See Hummel v. State, 99 P.2d 913, 917 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1940) ("The right of summary abatement of nuisances without judicial process or proceeding was
an established principle of the common law, and it has not been regarded as being abrogated by the
provisions of constitutions for the protection of life, liberty, and property, although the exercise of the
right might result in a destruction of property.").
9' This was the doctrine of ad coelum under which a landowner's ownership "extended to the
periphery of the universe," up to the heavens and down to the depths. United States v. Causby, 328
U.S. 256, 260-61 (1946).
99See id. at 261 (stating that "[t]he air is a public highway"); see also Ravich, supra note 41, at
604-05 (discussing the history of ad coelum and its abandonment during the era of mass air transit).
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land. It follows that landowners should be able to claim a freedom from
drone overflight in at least some portion of their airspace. The questions
are how high, and who sets the boundaries.
Although in principle "invasions [of airspace] are in the same category
as invasions of the surface,"' 01 today's landowners do not have an absolute
possessory right to all the airspace above their land, whether their claims
are based on the Takings Clause, 10 ' or on tort and contract principles. 0 2
Instead, a landowner has the right to only "as much space above the ground
as he can occupy or use in connection with the land." ' 3 That the
landowner has not in fact used the airspace is not material; the land must
only be reasonably subject to use. 0 4 Unhelpfully, the Restatement
(Second) of Torts states that "[f]light by aircraft in the air space above the
land of another is a trespass if, but only if ...it enters into the immediate
reaches of the airspace next to the land."' 5
Common-law rules defining a landowner's airspace can be preempted
by statute. 0 6 Congress has declared a "public right of freedom of transit
through the navigable airspace" of the United States. 7 "Navigable
airspace" is defined as the airspace above the minimum safe-operating
altitudes, including airspace needed for safe takeoff and landing.0 8 FAA
regulations define these minimum safe-operating altitudes for different
'ooCausby, 328 U.S. at 265.
'0' See id.at 258, 265 (holding that "frequent and regular flights" of aircraft over residential
property violated the Takings Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. V).
102See, e.g., Brandes v. Mitterling, 196 P.2d 464, 465 (Ariz. 1948) ("Extensive flying at low
altitudes, accompanied by excessive noise and occasioning unreasonable annoyance to the occupants of
the land below, and apprehension of danger on their part, has been held to constitute an element of
nuisance in that it interferes substantially with the enjoyment of the property by the occupants."); Jones
v. Wagner, 624 A.2d 166, 167 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (dealing with trespass by overhanging tree
branches); see also DOLAN & THOMPSON, supra note 74, at 11 (stating that Causby standards "are used
in property tort claims because there can be no trespass in airspace unless the property owner has some
possessory right to the airspace, which was the same question at issue in Causby").
"03
Causby, 328 U.S. at 264.
10 4
Id.
10'
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159(2)(a) (1965) (emphasis added).
106Note that the U.S. Supreme Court's cases addressing aerial surveillance under the Fourth
Amendment do not decide the issue of private air rights because the warrantless observations were all
taken from within the FAA-defined national airspace. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451-52
(1989) (sanctioning warrantless surveillance from helicopter flying at 400 feet); California v. Ciraolo,
476 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986) (allowing warrantless aerial observation of fenced-in backyard within
curtilage from altitude of 1,000 feet); Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 229, 239
(1986) (permitting warrantless aerial surveillance of chemical plant where the aircraft was "[a]t all
times . . . lawfully within navigable airspace" of 1,200 feet and higher). The issue in these three cases
was whether the surveillance was a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment such that a
warrant was required. These cases do not address the extent of the National Airspace System; rather
they address what a law-enforcement officer may do when within it.
107 49 U.S.C. § 40101(c)(2) (2012).
10
8Id.§ 40102(a)(32).
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kinds of aircraft.1 09
Generally, apart from takeoff and landing, fixed-wing aircraft must be
operated at an altitude that allows the aircraft to conduct an emergency
landing "without undue hazard to persons or property on the surface." 1 0 in
a congested area, the aircraft must operate at least "1,000 feet above the
highest obstacle within a horizontal radius of 2,000 feet of the aircraft." ''
In a non-congested area, the minimum safe-operating altitude is "500 feet
above the surface."'1 12 Over open water or sparsely populated areas, aircraft
"may not be operated closer than 500 feet to any person, vessel, vehicle, or
structure."' 13

Unlike fixed-wing aircraft, which are subject to specific minimum
safe-operating altitudes based on location, regulation of helicopter
minimum altitudes is more flexible. Under FAA regulations, a helicopter
may fly below the minimum safe altitudes prescribed for fixed-wing
aircraft if it is operated "without hazard to person or property on the
1
surface." 14
The FAA does not currently regulate minimum safe-operating altitudes
for drones.1 5 In its upcoming regulations the FAA anticipates different

'9See 14 C.F.R. § 91.119 (2015).
0
1d. § 91.119(a).
Id. § 91.119(b).
12 Id. § 91.119(c).
113Id.
4

1 1d. § 91.119(d).
"' DOLAN & THOMPSON, supra note 74, at 3. But while the FAA does not currently regulate
minimum safe operating altitudes for drones, it did, in 2007, issue a policy statement to the effect that
"no person may operate a UAS [unmanned aircraft system] in the National Airspace without specific

authority." Unmanned Aircraft Operations in the National Airspace System, 72 Fed. Reg. 6689, 6690
(Feb. 13, 2007). This means that all drone operators who do not fall within the recreational-use
exemption must apply to the FAA for permission to fly. See id.
Hobbyist drones that do fall within the recreational-use exemption were, until very recently,
subject only to a set of recommended standards. See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., ADVISORY CiRCULAR 9157, MODEL AIRCRAFT OPERATING STANDARDS (1981), http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/

media/AdvisoryCircular/91-57.pdf [http://perma.cc/N62S-FRUD]. Compliance with the circular was
voluntary. Id. But it recommended that operators fly a sufficient distance from populated areas and
away from noise-sensitive areas like parks, schools, hospitals, or churches. Id. Operators also were
asked not to fly in the vicinity of full-scale aircraft or more than 400 feet above the surface. Id. When
flying within three miles of an airport, operators were urged to notify an airport official. Id.
On September 2, 2015 the FAA replaced this guidance. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., ADVISORY
CIRCULAR 91-57A, MODEL AIRCRAFT OPERATING STANDARDS 1 (2015), http://www.faa.gov/
documentLibrary/media/AdvisoryCircular/AC_91-57A.pdf [http://perma.cc/V55 U-4AM7]. In the new
circular, the FAA now requires compliance. See id. at 2-3. While the FAA apparently recognizes that it
lacks authority to regulate hobbyist drones directly, it emphasizes its authority to regulate any objecthowever classified-that threatens the safety of the National Airspace System. Id. at 2. The FAA states
that if a hobbyist drone endangers the safety of the nation's airspace, the FAA may take legal action.
See id. With regard to height restrictions, the FAA states that "[miodel aircraft operators should follow
best practices including limiting operations to 400 feet above ground level (AGL)." Id. at 3.
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classes of rules for drones based on their size and capabilities.' 16 However
the FAA sets these standards, once in place they will set the lower bounds
for where drones may legally fly over private property. If federal law
defines a portion of the airspace as publicly navigable, that means that
drone operators are safe from an action for simple trespass within that
zone. The lack of a cause of action would in turn preclude any self-help
privilege. However, an action for nuisance or invasion of privacy would
still be possible. 17 Furthermore, since the FAA may not directly regulate
recreational use of model aircraft, 1 8 a classification that could include
certain types of drones, 1 9 state property law will continue to play a role in
defining the bounds of private airspace relevant to the use of drones and
state tort law will continue to define how landowners may react to
trespassory overflights by hobby pilots.
In the zone below that covered by federal law or regulation, just how
close to the ground constitutes the "immediate reaches" protected from
intruders may vary from state to state. 120 States can set the boundary below
the FAA standards. That is, while a state may not prohibit overflights that
the FAA permits, the state may expand the navigable airspace at the
expense of the property owner's exclusive airspace by setting the trespass

116See

infra Part III.A for potential administrative regulation.

"7 See Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765, 768, 770-71 (N.Y. 1970) (recognizing that
the tort of invasion of privacy does not require a physical trespass on plaintiff's property but could be
accomplished by remote eavesdropping); Thomburg v. Port of Portland, 376 P.2d 100, 108 (Or. 1962)
(noting that the jury could find noise nuisance in spite of the fact that airplanes were within navigable
airspace: "[t]here is ... no merit in the defense argument that all flights within the navigable airspace
are automatically free from liability").
"I FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 336(a), 126 Stat. 11, 77
(codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note (2012)).
"' See Huerta v. Pirker, Docket No. CP-217, at 7-8 (Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd. Mar. 6, 2014)
(holding that the FAA did not have authority to regulate model aircraft, thus assuming that the aircraft
at issue was in fact a hobby aircraft as opposed to a commercial drone as the FAA had alleged). The
FAA is appealing this decision. FAA Press Release (Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.faa.gov/
news/pressreleases/news story.cfmn?newsld=15894 [http://perma.cc/3GMJ-EPKD].
120 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 cmt. I (1965) ('"Immediate reaches' of the land
has not been defined as yet, except to mean that the aircraft flights were at such altitudes as to interfere
substantially with the landowner's possession and use of the airspace above the surface. No more
definite line can be drawn than is suggested by the word 'immediate.' In the ordinary case, flight at 500
feet or more above the surface is not within the 'immediate reaches,' while flight within 50 feet, which
interferes with actual use, clearly is, and flight within 150 feet, which also so interferes, may present a
question of fact."); see also Bevers v. Gaylord Broad. Co., No. 05-01-00895-CV, 2002 WL 1582286, at
*6 (Tex. App. 2002) (declining to specifically define "immediate reaches," but holding that "a single
ten-minute hover over [the landowner's] property at 300 to 400 feet does not, as a matter of law, rise to
the level of 'substantial interference"' (footnote omitted)). For an example of how one state set aerial
boundaries, see Act of July 29, 2013, § 15, 2013-2014 Or. Laws 1869, 1872 (providing trespass cause
of action for drone overflight below 400 feet if (1) there has been a previous overflight below 400 feet
and (2) the landowner "notified the owner or operator of the drone that the [landowner] did not want
the drone flown over the property at a height of less than 400 feet").
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line lower than the FAA's minimum altitude.' 2'
Deer Trail, Colorado illustrates an extreme version of how state and
local law might address these gaps in federal regulation, as the town
considered a plan to offer its residents drone-hunting licenses. 122 The FAA,
unsurprisingly, expressed skepticism at the legality of shooting down
drones. In response to Deer Trail's plan, the FAA stated that "[s]hooting at
an unmanned aircraft could result in criminal or civil liability, just as
would firing at a manned airplane."' 23 However, the FAA did not cite any
specific law backing this assertion, and the authority for it depends upon
how one reads the statute governing destruction of aircraft.' 24
b. Whether to Require Actual Harm: Conflation with the Tort of
Nuisance
While trespass is, for all practical purposes, subject to a rule of strict
liability,"' in cases of aerial trespass the rule merges with the traditional
standard for nuisance, which requires actual damages. 126 The Restatement
.2.
See, e.g., Act of July 29, 2013, § 15, 2013-2014 Or. Laws 1869, 1872 (setting minimum height
for drone overflight at 400 feet, well below FAA minimum height overflight limits for fixed-wing
aircraft).
122 See Ana Cabrera, Colorado Town's Vote on Drone Ordinance Postponed, CNN (Dec. 10,
2013, 9:44 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/lO/us/colorado-town-drone-ordinance/ [http://perma.cc/
F7FK-9HAN] (reporting that Deer Trail, Colorado entertained a vote as to whether residents could
shoot down federal drones).
123Id. (quoting an FAA press release).
124 18 U.S.C. § 32(a)(1) (2012). The issue is whether § 32(a)(1) covers shooting down a drone or
whether that statute is best understood as applying solely to the destruction of manned aircraft. Section
32(a)(1) makes it a crime punishable by up to twenty years in prison to willfully destroy "any aircraft in
the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States or any civil aircraft used, operated, or employed in
[commerce subject to federal regulation]." Id. An "aircraft" is defined as "a civil, military, or public
contrivance invented, used, or designed to navigate, fly, or travel in the air." Id. § 31(a)(1). Read
broadly, § 32(a)(1) would seem to apply even to the destruction of a model helicopter and certainly
would cover robotic aircraft.
While § 32(a)(1) makes it a crime to destroy an "aircraft," other subsections of § 32 refer instead
to an "aircraft in flight." See, e.g, id § 32(a)(3), (7). The definition of"in flight" assumes that there has
been "embarkation" and will be "disembarkation," two terms that generally refer to passengers. Id. §
31 (a)(4). The different language in § 32(a)(1) provides a textual hook for the argument that Congress
intended to extend coverage to the destruction of unmanned aircraft. On the other hand, one could
easily ask whether Congress intended such a potentially absurd result. At the time of the passage of the
1956 Act to Punish the Willful Damaging or Destroying of Aircraft or Motor Vehicles, and Their
Facilities, and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 709, 70 Stat. 539, the statute enacting what became
codified at § 32(a)(1), it seems highly unlikely that Congress intended to impose a twenty-year
sentence for destruction of a model airplane or foresaw the introduction of robotic aircraft. Cf United
States v. McGuire, 706 F.3d 1333, 1335 (11 th Cir. 2013) (concerning enhanced penalties for discharge
of handgun "in the general direction of an airbome police helicopter").
125 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (1965); see also supra notes 50-51 and
accompanying text.
126See Colin Cahoon, Comment, Low Altitude Airspace: A PropertyRights No-Man's Land, 56 J.
AIR L. & COM. 157, 175-76 (1990) (noting that "commentators seem to have accepted this
unconventional approach as unique to airspace trespass analysis").

[Vol. 48:1

CONNECTICUTLA W REVIEW

(Second) of Torts notes in a comment that it is a trespass to "fire projectiles

or to fly an advertising kite or balloon through the air above [another's
land], even though no harm is done to the land or the possessor's
enjoyment of it."' 27 This reflects the normal strict-liability rule. But in the
very next section, the Restatement declares that "[f]lights by aircraft in the
airspace above the land of another is a trespass if, but only if

. .

. it

'
interferes substantially with the other's use and enjoyment of the land."128
This rule superimposes a requirement of actual harm, thus conflating the

normal strict-liability rule of trespass with the rule of nuisance.129
Generally, a private 3 0 nuisance is a "nontrespassory invasion of

another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land."''

Whereas a

13 2
trespass is inherently wrongful, conduct constituting a nuisance is not.

127RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 cmt. i (1965).
25

Id. § 159.

129 By importing requirements from a nuisance claim, this departure from the trespass rule

effectively swallows the aerial trespass action. The courts' detour into aerial nuisance may be based on
a misreading of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 258, 264,
266-67 (1946) (holding that "frequent and regular flights of army and navy aircraft over respondents'
land at low altitudes" below those "within the navigable airspace which Congress placed within the
public domain" sufficiently diminished value of property to allow Takings claim under the Fifth
Amendment). Courts have read Causby to require actual interference with the owner's use or
enjoyment of her land for the overflight to be an actionable trespass. See, e.g., Pueblo of Sandia ex rel.
Chaves v. Smith, 497 F.2d 1043, 1045-46 (10th Cir. 1974) (affirming grant of summary judgment in
favor of defendant where plaintiff in trespass action failed to allege interference with actual use); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 cmt. k (1965) (noting that federal cases have read
Causby this way in the trespass context). This reading seems anomalous: in Causby, the Supreme Court
held that for there to be a taking under the Fifth Amendment-that is, for the government to have
appropriated private property under circumstances which require payment ofjust compensation-there
must be substantial interference with the owner's use or enjoyment of their property. See Causby, 328
U.S. at 266 ("Flights over private land are not a taking, unless they are so low and so frequent as to be a
direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the land."). There is no obvious reason
why the interference requirement should be as strict in a trespass claim. If aerial trespass genuinely is to
be treated like terrestrial trespass, then all that should be required is entrance into that part of the
airspace that remains fully private. Causby expressly holds that a landowner's nonuse of airspace does
not affect ownership. See id at 264 ("The landowner owns at least as much of the space above the
ground as he can occupy or use in connection with the land. The fact that he does not occupy it in a
physical sense-by the erection of buildings and the like-is not material." (citation omitted)). Properly
understood, then, Causby makes actual interference with use relevant only as a matter of substantive
constitutional Takings law, not as a matter of property law on ownership of airspace. If, however, state
courts continue to import Causby into aerial trespass law, the effect will be to minimize the importance
of trespass as a potential justification for self-help against aerial intrusions and thus increase the
potential importance of nuisance because there will be cases of classic trespass that do not amount to
nuisance if only because the interference was neither repeated nor continuous.
13o This is as compared with a public nuisance. A private nuisance interferes with an individual's
use and enjoyment of her land, while a public nuisance interferes with "a right common to the general
public." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979).
131Id. § 821D.
132 See Gregory C. Keating, Strict Liability Wrongs, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE

LAW OF TORTS 292, 296 (John Oberdiek ed., 2014) ("Nuisance law imposes liability for the infliction
of unreasonable harm when ... it holds that damages should be paid for an unreasonable interference
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The conduct constituting the nuisance becomes wrongful only when it
interferes with the plaintiffs use and enjoyment of her land.133
Further, nuisance law usually requires the interference to be repeated
or ongoing before it becomes actionable.' 34 A one-time interference may
be enough where it causes ongoing harm, but otherwise a single instance of
nuisance-like activity would not ordinarily give rise to a nuisance cause of
action. The question is thus whether the interference is substantial and
unreasonable. The types of problems that drones are likely to causenoise,135 dust, 13 6 and low overflights 3 7-would ordinarily require multiple
instances of inappropriate conduct by a single party before creating a right
to sue and thus a right to self-help. However, it is at least theoretically
possible that otherwise legal overflights might become a sanctionable
nuisance if the light or noise--or even legitimate fears about the privacy
consequences--caused a measurable diminution of an owner's enjoyment
of her property.
The extent of a property-owner's right of self-help against drone
overflights that are only nuisances but not trespasses 38 is a complicated
question beyond the scope of this Article. In practice, it is not likely to be a
common issue if only because the scenarios where there is only a nuisance
but not a trespass are likely to be those in which it will be particularly
difficult for the property owner to know who owns the drones overflying
her property. In theory, however, in a nuisance-only regime the luckless
drone operator who for the first time flew a drone over property that had
been overflown many times by others would have a cause of action against
a property owner who damaged the drone. In a pure trespass regime, by
contrast, the property owner would have the claim so long as she had an
exclusive right to the airspace and her self-help was otherwise reasonable.
with the plaintiff's rights to the reasonable use of their property, even though the conduct responsible
for that interference is justified and ought to be continued."); Gregory C. Keating, Nuisance as a Strict
Liability Wrong, 4 J. TORT L. 1, 3-4 (2012) (noting that nuisance creates strict liability for failure to
compensate for harms from an otherwise permissible action).
133KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, at 623.
134There is no actual requirement of continual

interference; the requirement is only that the
interference be substantial and unreasonable, a requirement that often cannot be met absent repeated
offenses. See id.
at 626-30
" See, e.g., Nestle v. City of Santa Monica, 496 P.2d 480, 485, 492 (Cal. 1972) (denying
recovery on inverse-condemnation claim predicated on airplane noise interference, but reversing
dismissal of nuisance claim); Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 376 P.2d 100, 110 (Or. 1962) (noting that
it is a question for the jury as to whether there was a taking by noise nuisance).
136See, e.g., Nitram Chems. v. Parker, 200 So. 2d 220, 225 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (concluding
that evidence of smoke, noise, and dust was sufficient to support nuisance verdict for landowner).
117 See, e.g., Seale v. Pearson, 736 So. 2d 1108, 1109-10, 1113-14 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999)
(affirming trial court's finding of nuisance based on low overflights).
38 One example might be flight above the vertical curtilage that nonetheless caused a disturbance
or distress. Another example-one subject to First Amendment limitations-might be camera-carrying
drones patrolling up and down just outside the property line.
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3. InteractionBetween Trespass and Privacy Torts
In some cases of trespass, the major harm will come not from the
technical intrusion, but from the invasion of privacy that follows as the
robot or drone takes pictures, conducts other sense-enhanced surveillance,
or monitors wireless telephone or Wi-Fi communications. These harms can
be conceptualized as damages from the trespass, or as separate privacy
torts. In cases where the surveillance does not involve an actual trespass,
such as observation from beyond the property line or in public places, the
privacy torts will commonly be the property owner's main option. When
there is a trespass, the anticipated privacy damages are capable of
supplying the grounds for a reasonable belief that self-help is necessary to
protect the actor and that "the harm inflicted is not unreasonable as
compared with the harm threatened."' 3 9 The Restatement (Second) of Torts
limits this privilege "to protect the actor's land or chattels or his possession
of them,"' 4 ° but as we argue in the next Part, given the magnitude of the
dangers, there are good reasons to extend this right of self-defense to
privacy harms also.
D. Invasion of Privacy by Robots as a Justificationfor Self-Help
Privacy torts present the most difficult, but also some of the most
important, justifications for self-defense against robots. Invasions of
privacy can result in very significant harms, so the privilege of self-help
should in theory be broad. That said, there are significant issues with how a
person facing a robot could know what it is capable of and (just as in the
case of trespass 14 ) the extent to which a person is entitled to assume the
worst. Whether or not one can assume the worst of the robot, there are also
difficult issues of deciding when a potential harm justifies the financial
cost of harming the robot.
This cost-benefit analysis is particularly difficult for privacy torts
because it involves value judgments about privacy, requiring us to ask
what sorts of self-help should be permitted, rather than just whether the
drone looks more expensive than the property to be defended. It is easy to
say that one may not destroy a thing of great value to protect a thing of
little value, but it is clearly difficult to extend this precise calculus to areas
where the interest in property is to be balanced against a more ethereal, or
at least less easily and immediately quantifiable, interest like privacy.
Responses to robot privacy invasions also involve questions of
perceived threats by robots-perceptions which may not always be
"' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 260 (1965).
140Id
4' See supra Part ll.C.2 (reasoning that the novelty of drones may initially be used to justify more
self-help, but that this may change as the technology becomes more common).

2015]

SELF-DEFENSEAGAINST ROBOTS AND DRONES

accurate, but which sometimes may nonetheless be considered reasonable
in law. In addition, they include cases where the intrusion is not necessarily
detected while it is ongoing. For example, if the landowner does not see or
hear a drone, it will be much harder to make a nuisance claim because it is
hard to argue that an unnoticed intrusion interferes with use or enjoyment
of the property.
Whether or not the invasion of privacy is detected while it occurs,
these intrusions are the domain of a relatively exotic branch of tort law: the
privacy torts. Classically, there are four privacy torts 142 including public
disclosure, 143 false light,'" and appropriation of name or likeness, 145 but
the only one a robot is likely to commit, and therefore the only one
relevant to this Article, is intrusion on solitude and seclusion. Intrusion on
solitude and seclusion is a recognized.4 6 if somewhat unusual tort, but14its
7
relative rarity in the courts means that it is poorly charted legal territory.
The tort of intrusion on seclusion protects an individual from (1)
"highly offensive" intrusions upon (2) reasonable expectations of
privacy. 48 As home-based robots, and the "Internet of Things" more
generally, increase the number of devices in the home that can collect data
about people and send this data back to a central monitoring station, the
149
tort of intrusion on seclusion might seem poised for explosive growth.
Two factors, however, reduce the potential scope of intrusion-on-seclusion
claims as against non-strangers. First, many types of quite possibly
142KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, at 851.

141See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977) ("One who gives publicity to a matter
concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the
matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of
legitimate concern to the public.").
'44 See id. § 652E ("One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other
before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if (a) the
false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the
actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the
false light in which the other would be placed.").
145See id. § 652C ("One who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of
another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of privacy.").
146Id. § 652B; see also DOLAN & THOMPSON, supra note 74, at 14 n. 111 ("North Dakota and
Wyoming are the only states not to adopt the privacy tort of intrusion upon seclusion."). See generally
KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, at 854-56 (providing background on the cause of action).
147See, e.g., KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, at 854-56 (describing examples and principles that
form the existing understanding of the tort); see also Mitchel J. Ezer, Intrusion on Solitude: Herein of
Civil Rights and Civil Wrongs, 21 L. TRANSITION 63, 63 (1961); Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of
Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 477, 552-55 (2006) (discussing the lack of doctrinal consistency and
broadness of this legal area).
4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).

John Villasenor, Observationsfrom Above: Unmanned Aircraft Systems and Privacy, 36
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 457, 501 (2013) ("Although privacy expectations are greatly reduced outside
the home, the non-governmental use of a UAS to capture images and other information taken while the
individual is in a public setting could nonetheless constitute an invasion of privacy.").
149 Cf
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outrageous technological monitoring will be swept up by contractual terms
of service in which the consumer-in some small print-agrees to the
surveillance. So long as those terms of service are not adjudged to be void
as against public policy, the contract will preempt the tort. 5 ' Second, many
other robotic intrusions into the home or the curtilage will be by explicit or
implicit invitation. Just as the pizza delivery person is not intruding on
seclusion as he peers across the threshold while handing over a pie, so too
a robot delivering a package (or its controllers) will count as invitees, not
privacy invaders. In the case of most deliveries, the terms of sale likely
will spell this out also, at least after the first lawsuit. 5' On the other hand,
in the absence of a contractual relationship, drones surveying the
neighborhood in order to profile residents for marketing purposes would
not, we hope, count as either invitees or licensees.
The tort of intrusion on seclusion gains most of its traction in cases
against strangers. What is more, the less the victim knows about the robot
spy, or suspected spy, the more its surveillance is likely to seem a threat.
The more the surveillance seems a threat, the more likely it is that the
victim will seek not just a judicial remedy-uncertain, likely timeconsuming and costly, and probably much too late to undo the harm-but
also self-help remedies. Although the core principles of the intrusion-onseclusion tort are well defined and fit the robot context, there is uncertainty
as to the interaction of the intrusion-on-seclusion tort with the self-help
principle. In our research, we found no cases holding that intrusion on
seclusion does not justify a privilege for self-help in appropriate
circumstances. On the other hand, we have also been unable to find any
cases holding that intrusion on seclusion does create a privilege for
appropriate self-help.
There is likely a simple reason why case law gives so little-maybe
zero-guidance as to when a privacy tort justifies self-help by the victim,
and if so, how much. Consider one of the more common types of intrusionon-seclusion cases: the peeping landlord.' 5 2 These cases never seem to
involve any legal issue relating to the tenant's destruction or conversion of
150An example might be the recent revelation that Samsung's SmartTV Privacy Policy warned,

"[p]lease be aware that if your spoken words include personal or other sensitive information, that
information will be among the data captured and transmitted to a third party through your use of Voice
Recognition." Samsung Television Spies on Viewers, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (Feb. 13, 2015, 7:01
AM), https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2015/02/samsung_televis.html [http://perma.cc/7MJ39XWC]. By warning of the surveillance in terms incorporated into its contract with the consumer,
Samsung greatly reduced the likelihood of any tort claim.
151See supra note 58 (contemplating this issue in the context of Amazon's plan to introduce
delivery drones).
152See, e.g., Hamberger v. Eastman, 206 A.2d 239, 239 (N.H. 1964) (describing a case where a
landlord installed a listening and recording device in a husband and wife's bedroom); Roach v. Harper,
105 S.E.2d 564, 565 (W.Va. 1958) (describing a case where a tenant brought a claim against a landlord
who installed a listening device in a tenant's apartment).
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equipment placed in order to spy on her because the circumstances would
make the spying landlord's complaint about the tenant's self-help almost
sanctionable. Suppose the tenant disables or keeps the hidden camera that
was placed in a bedroom or bathroom. In these cases we would not expect
to see a claim for replevin from the landlord who installed the camera, as a
court would see it as pure chutzpah. For example, in Miller v. Brooks, 153 an
estranged wife trespassed and secreted a camera in the bedroom of her
husband's apartment, prompting the husband to take the camera and watch
the recording.' 54 The court noted this in its survey of the facts, but the wife
55
apparently did not demand the camera or the videotape back.
As far as we are aware, claims of excessive self-help involving chattels
have yet to come up in cases about illegal eavesdropping, wiretapping, or
recording. But one can imagine many cases in which homeowners and
others would be concerned about a drone spying on them and might be
motivated to interfere with it or strike at it. A drone following someone
around town likely would be an actionable nuisance and in some cases
might rise to the level of intentional infliction of emotional distress,' 5 6 not
to mention creating civil' 57 or criminal liability for stalking.' 58 But what
happens when a journalist (or paparazzi) drone overflies property whose
owner shoots it down fearing that the drone is spying on her? Will the
drone-owning journalist have a claim or will the self-help be considered
justified?
In the absence of guidance from case law and statutes, we turn to
policy arguments for why self-help should and should not be allowed in
such instances.

' 472 S.E.2d 350 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996).
114Id. at
55

352-53.
. Id. at 352.
156See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965) ("One who by extreme and outrageous
conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for
such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.").
...See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.7 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 2 of 2015 Reg. Sess.)
(codifying the civil tort of stalking); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.220 (West, Westlaw through 2015
Reg. Sess.) (providing that a civil action may be maintained against a person who commits the crime of
stalking).
"' See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.048 (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.) (defining
the crime of stalking); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-59-2 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 555 of Jan. 2014
Sess.) (same); see also NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROJECT TO DEVELOP A
MODEL ANTI-STALKING CODE FOR STATES 43 (1993), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/Digitization/

144477NCJRS.pdf [https://perma.cc/8RUV-34LU] (recommending that states make stalking a felony).
Although no state has adopted the Model Code in full, a number of states have adopted anti-stalking
statutes that incorporate provisions and definitions from the model act. 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 16.4(b) (2d ed. 2003).
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1. Reasons for Permitting Self-Help Against Robotic Intrusions on
Seclusion
The argument for permitting self-help in response to the tort of
intrusion on seclusion starts with the two fundamental reasons for
permitting self-help at all.' 59 First, the intrusion creates an exigency in
which resort to legally administered remedies would be impractical
because any robot equipped with a radio or a cell-phone chip can transmit
the data it records in seconds. Worse, the damage from intrusive recordings
may be impossible to remedy after the fact. One cannot purchase new
dignity. Second, even violent self-help against an overflying drone poses a
reduced risk of breaching the peace compared to the ordinary self-help
160
case. Attacking a drone is not the same as attacking its owner directly.
Plus, the drone's owner or operator often may not be in the nearby vicinity
and thus will not be able to react impulsively-at least so long as the drone
itself is unarmed. Society's interest in law and order thus poses only a
reduced barrier to permitting even severe forms of self-help against robots
in defense of privacy.
Two specific characteristics of the intrusion-on-seclusion tort provide
additional justifications for permitting self-help. First, because the tort
16 1
requires that the invasion be not just offensive, but "highly offensive,"
the number of cases where the privilege exists will depend on how
offensive society finds robotic spying. But in that set of relatively extreme
cases, the scope of permissible self-help deserves to be broad. More
serious threats and harms may be met with more vigorous self-help. 62 And
while a phrase like "highly offensive" is malleable, it sets a high bar. In
one court's words, the invasion must amount to "[o]utrageously
unreasonable conduct.'

1' 63

A self-help privilege in response to what reasonably appears to be a
robotic privacy intrusion should be permitted because privacy invasions by
'

59

See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.

Where a paparazzo is holding a camera, the law will unify the person and the chattel so that to
strike the camera is to strike the human. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18 cmt. c (1965)
(stating that offensive battery covers not just instances of direct contact with the plaintiff, but also
contact with "anything so connected with [the plaintiff's] body as to be customarily regarded as part
[thereof]"). Where the landlord plants the camera in the tenant's bedroom, however, the unification
does not occur because there is neither "offense to the dignity involved in the unpermitted and
intentional invasion of the inviolability of his person" nor "any physical harm done to his
body." Id
161RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977) (emphasis added).
162For example, "[a]n individual who is under immediate threat has the option to respond with
'

roughly the same degree of force that a state actor, such as a police officer, could use in the same
situation." Adam B. Badawi, Self-Help and the Rules of Engagement, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 31 (2012).
163N.O.C., Inc. v. Schaefer, 484 A.2d 729, 733 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1984). For a survey of cases in
which there was and was not liability for intrusion on seclusion, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 652B (1977).
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robots differ from privacy invasions by humans. Robots, especially drones,
increase an individual's ability to spy on others in contexts where they
have a reasonable expectation of privacy. While a neighbor may have
binoculars, and a private detective likely has a telephoto lens, 64 drones are
unique in several ways that make them potentially a greater threat to
privacy. First, drones can spy on you from vantage points that homeowners
have historically had no reason to fear. In addition, drones can spy without
trespassing.' 65 And when drones do trespass, they are difficult to detect.
Further, they may be able to stay in spying position for longer than
humans. Drones may also be able to transmit the data more quickly.'66
Finally, even where drones do not in fact heighten these dangers, the risk
of privacy invasion may reasonably appear to be large because of the
newness of robots. Thus, at least initially, violent self-help will seem-and
often may be-reasonable even when the privacy threat is minimal-or not
even extant.
2. Reasons for Not Permitting Self-Help Against Robotic Intrusions
on Seclusion
The arguments against permitting self-help in cases of robotic
intrusions on seclusion are not as strong as those for it. One argument is
that it will be hard to engage in self-help safely. The fear of injuring others
is, however, more an argument against particular methods of self-help than
against self-help in general. One can favor a broad right of self-help and
still oppose it in the form of shooting guns in the air to down drones.
164See,

e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b, illus. 2 (1977) ("A, a private

detective seeking evidence for use in a lawsuit, rents a room in a house adjoining B's residence, and for
two weeks looks into the windows of B's upstairs bedroom through a telescope taking intimate pictures
with a telescopic lens. A has invaded B's privacy.").
165There can be an intrusion on seclusion without a trespass. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 13,
at 854-55 ("[T]he principle [of intrusion on seclusion] has, however, been carried beyond ... physical
intrusion, and extended to eavesdropping upon private conversations by means of wiretapping and
microphones; and there are decisions indicating that it is to be applied to peering into the windows of a
home, as well as persistent and unwanted telephone calls." (footnotes omitted)); see also RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 1050 (8th ed. 2004) ("The tort of invasion of privacy does
not require a physical trespass on plaintiff's property, but may be accomplished by eavesdropping near
an open window or by overhearing conversations by means of a parabolic microphone.").
Logically, one might suspect robots that came near to one's property, especially if they hung
around, but absent trespass or a pattern of stalking, there will rarely if ever be a privilege to attack a
robot off of one's property even if one suspects that it is spying. The existence of a trespass makes it
more reasonable to conclude that the robot may be spying. As a general matter, the privilege to defend
against spying is not a roving commission to attack nearby robots. A person would need a reasonable
belief, supported by evidence, that the robot was spying before having any privilege to react. For
example, even if a person suspected that a robot hovering around her property was spying, she would
not be able to attack the robot absent a physical trespass or clear pattern of stalking.
166One interesting question is whether, all else being equal, being recorded by a robot and thus
not knowing who is doing the spying, is more or less offensive than being recorded by a human with a
camera. But that is a question legitimately left to a jury.
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Another argument against allowing self-help is that it will encourage
people concerned about drones to shoot down legitimate overflights such
as law-enforcement drones, thus posing a threat to public safety. Or, there
is the risk that self-helpers might shoot down a manned vehicle by mistake.
Permitting self-help may encourage people to fire guns in the air, and may
cause harm when a drone is downed. Further, if the self-helper misjudges
the existence or scope of her privilege, she may commit a trespass to
chattels or conversion. Self-help actions like these pose a threat to the
state's monopoly on force.167
All of these arguments are based on general criticisms of self-help, or
the reasons why tort law evolved to displace self-created remedies.16 The
primitive but prevailing "ad hoc system" of self-help, it is often argued,
inevitably "leads to breaches of the peace, violence, and inequities."' 69 As
one state supreme court justice declared, "[s]elf-help may well be the first
step toward anarchy."' 70 These critiques are valid in the robot context too,
but just as these legitimate concerns have not proved the death knell for
self-help generally, they should not prevent an appropriate right of selfhelp as against robots. While it is true that the general trend in the law over
the past century has been to curtail self-help remedies to specific types of
harms, this movement has usually been justified on the theory that the state
is ready and able to settle disputes and that self-help carries more risks of
social conflict than its benefits justify.'7 1 Privacy-destroying drones seem
like a strong case for another exception to that trend: until and unless
society finds a way to hold drone operators accountable for their privacy
violations, the ordinary reasons for disfavoring self-help are absent. There
do not appear to be any reasons unique to the robot context that weigh
against a broad self-help right. In fact, there are unique features weighing
in its favor.
III. STATUTORY CONSIDERATIONS RELATING TO DRONES AND
DRIVERLESS CARS

While we have thus far concentrated on tort law-the traditional
common-law remedy for civil wrongs-statutes and regulations bear on
the self-help issues discussed in several ways. To date, legislatures and
agencies have generally focused on drones rather than robots more
67

See Joshua Horwitz & Casey Anderson, Taking Gun Rights Seriously: The InsurrectionistIdea

and Its Consequences, 1 ALB. GOV'T L. REv. 496, 504 (2008) ("[A] monopoly on legitimate force...
is the fundamental organizing principle of any political entity, including a democracy like the United
States.").
6 See supra text accompanying notes 21-30.
169Brandon et al., supra note 14, at 853.
...
Duthie v. Lewiston Gun Club, 663 P.2d 287, 298 (Idaho 1983) (Bistline, J., dissenting).
171See generally Brandon et al., supranote 14.
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broadly. FAA rules currently declare the bounds of the airspace in which
fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters may fly. These rules have clear
consequences for defining the size of the cuboid to which a landowner may
claim exclusive possession.72 While the FAA navigable-airspace
regulation is not a privacy regulation, it declares how close others may
come to the home and thus bears on the home's solitude. Insofar as the
FAA regulation limits when a landowner has a cause of action, it also helps
shape her right of self-help.
Further, if the FAA is authorized and undertakes to act in the privacy
arena, it would be able to structure the general drone-related privacy
regime through private causes of action, civil fines, and even crimes. Here,
we examine the FAA's regulatory activities pertaining to drones. We then
discuss whether the FAA has authority to regulate drone-related privacy
issues and whether it seems intent on doing so. Finally, we look to state
laws and how they affect drone-related privacy issues.
A. Potential Federal Aviation Administration Regulation of Drone
Privacy
The FAA's latest proposed rules, announced in February 2015,173
would impose severe limits on commercial drone operators. While the
proposed rules do not address privacy, 7 4 they would prevent overflights
over individuals not involved in the drone operation, 17 5 permit operation
only during daylight hours,' 76 and require the operator or an assigned
observer to maintain the drone within eyesight.'7 7 The proposed rules
would not affect hobbyist drones, but the FAA intends to affirm its
enforcement authority to pursue hobbyist operators who endanger the
safety of the national airspace system ("NAS"). 178
172See

supra text accompanying notes 100-18 (surveying the bounds of flight for fixed-wing

aircraft, helicopters, and drones). While the U.S. Supreme Court has noted that a law-enforcement
officer could violate the Fourth Amendment while lawfully within the publicly navigable airspace of
the United States, see Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451 (1989) ("This is not to say that an inspection
of the curtilage of a house from an aircraft will always pass muster under the Fourth Amendment
simply because the plane is within the navigable airspace specified by law."), it seems clear that an
action for simple trespass under state law would not lie where the FAA has declared that the defendant
was within the navigable airspace. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("[T]he Laws of the United States...
shall be the supreme Law of the Land ... ").
...Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80 Fed. Reg. 9544
(proposed Feb. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 21, 43, 45, 47, 61, 91, 101, 107 & 183)
[hereinafter Small Drones NPRM].
74Id. at 9552 (noting that privacy issues "are beyond the scope of this rulemaking").
'"Id.at 9576.
...
Id. at 9561.
177Id. at 9559, 9560.
178 Id. at 9555. Additionally, on September 2, 2015, the FAA issued Advisory Circular Number
91-57A, asserting its authority to pursue legal remedies against hobbyist drones that endanger the NAS.
FED. AVIATION ADMIN., ADVISORY CIRCULAR 91-57A, MODEL AIRCRAFT OPERATING STANDARDS I
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Discussed in more detail below, these proposals are the product of a
complicated statutory and regulatory regime. In the FAA Modernization
and Reform Act of 2012 ("FMRA"), 179 Congress tasked the FAA with
devising rules to ensure the safe integration of drones into domestic
airspace. FMRA directed the FAA to engage in two sets of rulemakings.
The first required that the FAA issue a final rule on integrating "small
unmanned aircraft systems" into the national airspace by September
2015,8' although this deadline passed without FAA action."'8 The second
requires the FAA to develop a "comprehensive plan to safely accelerate the
integration2 of civil unmanned aircraft systems into the national airspace
8

system."'1

The FAA recently published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(NPRM) on small drones,' 83 defined as those under fifty-five pounds.' 84
The specifics of this framework are discussed below, followed by a survey
of FMRA and other relevant FAA powers and duties.
The FAA also stated plans to expedite its certification process, moving
from a drone-by-drone regime to a model-by-model regime,' 85 although
drones under fifty-five pounds will not require any airworthiness
certification.' 86 In addition to certifying the drone or model itself, the FAA
will require pilot and aircrew certification.' 87 Pilot certification will be
important because the FAA has ruled out autonomous flight for most
[http://per
(2015), http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/AdvisoryCircular/AC_91-57A.pdf
ma.cc/V55U-4AM7].
"I FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, 126 Stat. 11 (codified at 49
U.S.C. § 40101 note (2012)).
ISO
Id.§ 332(b)(1).
181See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., FAA'S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FAA MODERNIZATION AND
REFORM ACT OF 2012 REMAINS INCOMPLETE: STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CALVIN L. SCOVEL III
BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE 1 (2014), http://transport

ation.house.gov/uploadedfiles/2014-02-05-scovel.pdf [http://perma.cc/FTN8-F47Z] ("While FAA has
made progress meeting the act's UAS provisions, it has determined that it will not meet the September
2015 deadline for UAS integration due to a series of complex technological, regulatory, and managerial
barriers.").
182FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 § 332(a)(1).
183Small Drones NPRM, 80 Fed. Reg. 9544.
184FED. AVIATION ADMIN, INTEGRATION OF CIVIL UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (UAS) IN
THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM (NAS) ROADMAP 48 (2013) [hereinafter FAA ROADMAP],
http://www.faa.gov/uas/media/uasroadmap_2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/GZL2-33JV].
185
See id. at 25 ("Detailed consideration of UAS in the certification process will be limited in
number until such time as a broad and significant consideration is given to existing standards,
regulations, and policy. This will be facilitated by UAS manufacturers making application for type
design approval to the FAA. For type design approval, UAS designers must show they meet acceptable
safety levels for the basic UAS design, and operators must employ certified systems that enable
compliance with standardized air traffic operations and contingency/emergency procedures for UAS.").
86Small Drones NPRM, 80 Fed. Reg. at 9576-77.
7Id. at 9567-72 (outlining eligibility requirements to obtain a drone operator certificate, which
include, inter alia, being at least seventeen years old, possessing proficiency in the English language,
and passing initial and recurrent aeronautical knowledge tests).
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drones.
In 2012, FMRA directed the FAA to establish six test ranges for
drones,'8 9 and the FAA has used these test ranges as a laboratory for its
initial, but somewhat limited, drone privacy policies. In the words of the
FAA, "[t]he overall purpose of this test site program is to develop a body
of data and operational experiences to inform integration and the safe
operation of these aircraft in the National Airspace System."' 9 ° In a recent
final rule, the FAA required all test site operators to have written and
publicly available privacy policies which are "informed" by Fair
Information Practice principles, to accept public comment on their privacy
policies, and to review and update the policies as needed.' 9' While these
policies do not necessarily define the FAA's long-term approach, they are
meant to "help inform the dialogue among policy makers, privacy
'
advocates, and the industry."192
Additionally, 193 operators will need to
comply with state and local laws that regulate privacy. 194 This nonpreemption of state laws is significant. Of the states that are hosting the test
sites, three have enacted drone legislation: Oregon,195 Texas, 196 and
Virginia. 9 7 These sites will thus test the existing state policies and provide
valuable evidence of effectiveness for future state action.
Whether FMRA enables the FAA to regulate privacy issues outside of
18 See FAA ROADMAP, supra note 184, at 33 ("Autonomous operations are not permitted....
The [pilot-in-command] has full control, or override authority to assume control at all times during
normal UAS operations.").
189FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 332(c)(1), 126 Stat. 11,
74 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note (2012)).
'9'
Unmanned Aircraft System Test Site Program, 78 Fed. Reg. 12,259, 12,259 (Feb. 22, 2013) (to
be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 91). The FAA received 25 applications for test sites located in twenty-four
different states. FAA Announces Six UAS Test Sites, FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (Mar. 13, 2015, 3:26 PM),
http://www.faa.gov/uas/legislative_programs/test_sites/ [http://perma.cc/7QFK-FLYY]. The FAA
considered "geography, climate, location of ground infrastructure, research needs, airspace use, safety,
aviation experience and risk," and selected the University of Alaska, the State of Nevada, New York's
Griffiss International Airport, the North Dakota Department of Commerce, Texas A&M UniversityCorpus Christi, and Virginia Tech as the test sites. Press Release, FAA Selects Unmanned Aircraft
Systems Research and Test Sites (Dec. 30, 2013), http://www.faa.gov/news/press-releases/
news story.cfm?newsid=15576 [http://perma.cc/MD8W-32VM].
191Unmanned Aircraft System Test Site Program, 78 Fed. Reg. 68,360, 68,364 (Nov. 14, 2013)
(to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 91).
192FAA ROADMAP, supra note 184, at 12.
193 This list is not exhaustive of the requirements; see Unmanned Aircraft System Test Site
Program, 78 Fed. Reg. at 68,364 for a full list of requirements.
194The FAA requires that operators comply with "all Applicable Law regarding the protection of
an individual's right to privacy." Unmanned Aircraft System Test Site Program, 78 Fed. Reg. at
68,364. "Applicable Law" is defined to mean "(i) a law, order, regulation, or rule of an administrative
or legislative government body with jurisdiction over the matter in question, or (ii) a ruling, order,
decision or judgment of a court with jurisdiction over the matter in question." Id.
'9'
Act of July 29, 2013, 2013-2014 Or. Laws 1869.
196Texas Privacy Act, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 3691.
"97
An Act to Place a Moratorium on the Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 2013 Va. Acts 1408.
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its test-site mandate is debatable. The Congressional Research Service
(CRS) concluded that it would be reasonable for the FAA to interpret
FMRA as tasking the FAA with addressing privacy in its drone-related
rulemaking.' 9 8 The FAA, however, takes a more complicated view of its
own authority. It found the authority to regulate privacy at the test sites in
49 U.S.C. § 106()(6),99 which authorizes the FAA Administrator to enter
into a test-site agreement "on such terms as the Administrator may
consider appropriate."2 ° On this logic, one would expect that the FAA
could find authority to regulate drone-related privacy more generally by
latching onto the "acceptable standards for operation" language in
FMRA.20 ' If the FAA can find specific authority to regulate privacy at test
sites in a general grant of power, FMRA would seem to provide, more
generally, an equally strong basis for the existence of statutory authority to
regulate drone-related privacy.
But the FAA disagrees. It stated in its Roadmap that its "mission does
not include developing or enforcing policies pertaining to privacy or civil
liberties."2 2 Moreover, in establishing privacy policies for the test sites, it
aerospace
stated that its "mission is to provide the safest, most efficient
20 3
system in the world and does not include regulating privacy.In any event, whether or not the FAA has authority under FMRA to
regulate drone-related privacy, it seems that the FAA either believes it
lacks that authority or has no intention of using it. Instead, the FAA seems
willing to have states chart the course for protection of privacy in the drone
context and shows no appetite to preempt them." In the recent NPRM on
98DOLAN & THOMPSON, supra note 74, at 22-27. The CRS concluded that while under step one

of Chevron, FMRA does not expressly authorize the FAA to regulate privacy, "the open-ended nature
of Congress's instructions to the FAA, coupled with the prominence of privacy concerns, would likely
persuade a court that the FAA's potential regulation of privacy as part of formal rulemaking is a
reasonable interpretation of FMRA that should be accorded deference under a Chevron analysis." Id.at
23, 25.
199Unmanned Aircraft System Test Site Program, 78 Fed. Reg. at 68,361 ("The FAA's authority
for including the Final Privacy Requirements in the Test Site OTAs is set forth in 49 U.S.C.
106(l)(6).").
200 49 U.S.C. § 106(/)(6) (2012).
20 FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 332(a)(2)(A)(i), 126 Stat.
11, 73 (codified at 49 § U.S.C. 40101 note (2012)).
202FAA ROADMAP, supra note 184, at 11.
201
Unmanned Aircraft System Test Site Program, 78 Fed. Reg. at 68,361.
2"4The Joint Planning and Development Agency (JPDO), which includes representatives of the
"Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) partner agencies-the Departments of
Transportation (DOT), Defense (DoD), Commerce (DOC), and Homeland Security (DHS), the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA)," JOINT PLANNING & DEV. OFFICE, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (UAS) COMPREHENSIVE

PLAN: A REPORT ON THE NATION'S UAS PATH FORWARD 3 (2013) [hereinafter JPDO PLAN],
http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters-offices/agi/reports/media/uas_comprehensive_plan.
pdf [http://perma.cc/D8S5-SXW6], issued a report that suggests that additional regulation of privacy is
unnecessary because "many states have laws that protect individuals from invasions of privacy which
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drones under fifty-five pounds, the FAA noted that privacy issues are
"beyond the scope of this rulemaking.- 21 5 Thus, it seems likely that at least
in the near future, state and local laws will continue to play a leading role
in privacy protection.
Whether the FAA decision to not regulate to protect privacy was
reasonable is currently the subject of a challenge before the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.2" 6 Petitioners argue that FMRA requires the
FAA to develop a "Comprehensive Plan" to integrate drones into the NAS
and that the FAA wrongly concluded that privacy issues are beyond the
scope of its authorized rulemaking.20 7
For now, instead of the FAA regulating, and in addition to state and
local action, the Commerce Department will coordinate. On February 15,
2015, President Obama issued an order20 8 directing all federal agencies that
use drones to ensure that their collection of personally identifiable
information complies with the Privacy Act of 1974. 2o9 The order permits
data collection via drones only where it is "consistent with and relevant to
an authorized purpose." 21 ° The order also calls for a "multi-stakeholder
engagement process to develop and communicate best practices for
privacy, accountability, and transparency issues regarding commercial and
private UAS use in the NAS. ' ' 21t The National Telecommunications and
Information Administration, a part of the Commerce Department, is
directed to initiate this process, but it must limit its focus to commercial,
2
rather than law-enforcement or governmental use of drones. 21
But even if the FAA wanted to regulate drone privacy issues generally,
there would still be a hole in its authority: FMRA bars the FAA from
could be applied to intrusions committed by using a UAS." Id. at 7. The FAA also noted a similar
reason for not imposing privacy requirements beyond the context of the test sites: "there are many
privacy laws and applications of tort law that may address some of the privacy issues that arise from
UAS operations at the Test Sites." Unmanned Aircraft System Test Site Program, 78 Fed. Reg. at
68,362. The FAA thus concluded that it did not need to "monitor a Test Site's compliance with its own
privacy policies" because the FAA "expects ... [the] respective state/local oversight bodies to monitor
and enforce a Test Site's compliance with its own policies." Id. at 68,363. Finally, the FAA stated that
"[fQorty-three states have already enacted or are considering legislation regulating use of UAS." Id. at
68,362.
205Small Drones NPRM, 80 Fed. Reg. 9544, 9552 (proposed Feb. 23, 2015) (to be
codified at 14
C.F.R. pts. 21, 43, 45, 47, 61, 91, 101, 107 & 183).
206See Brief for Petitioner at 2, Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. FAA, No. 15-1075 (D.C. Cir. filed
Sept. 28, 2015), https://epic.org/privacy/litigation/apa/faa/drones/1575326-EPIC-Opening-Brief pdf
[https://perma.cc/8BY9-PXTW].
20
7 Id. at 28, 35.
208 Memorandum on Promoting Economic Competitiveness While Safeguarding Privacy, Civil
Rights, and Civil Liberties in Domestic Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80 Fed. Reg. 9355, 9355
(Feb. 15, 2015) [hereinafter Presidential Memorandum].
2095 U.S.C. § 552a (2012).
210Presidential Memorandum, 80 Fed. Reg. at 9356.
2' Id. at 9357.
212 ld.
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promulgating rules regarding certain types of model aircraft flown for
recreational use.213 This bar applies where the model aircraft is less than
fifty-five pounds, does not interfere with any manned aircraft, and is flown
in accordance with a community-based set of safety guidelines.2 1 4 The
aircraft must also be flown within the line of sight of the operator and be
used solely for recreational purposes.2" 5 But while the FAA is prohibited
from writing rules or regulations governing these aircraft, it is not
prohibited from pursuing enforcement actions "against persons operating6
21
model aircraft who endanger the safety of the national airspace system.,
In any event, the model aircraft limitation on the FAA's authority does not
apply to rules concerning drones flown for commercial purposes. 1 7
The NPRM proposes to require commercial drone operators to keep
their drones within visual-line-of-sight ("VLOS") of either a drone
operator or an assigned observer. 218 The FAA reiterates this requirement,
specifically stating that, at all times, the drone "must remain close enough
to the operator for the operator to be capable of seeing the aircraft with
vision unaided by any device other than corrective lenses. ''2' 9 Additionally,
the FAA proposes that small drones may not fly over any persons not
directly involved in the operation. 22 ° Finally, the rules would require that
small drones be operated only during daylight, defined in the relevant
221
provision as "official sunrise to official sunset, local time.
The FAA's NPRM proposes that drone operators should be licensed,
having to pass an "initial aeronautical knowledge test" and be vetted by the
Transportation Security Administration.22 2 The FAA would not permit
operation of small drones by anyone under seventeen years of age, would
require operators to make their drones available for FAA inspection or
testing upon request, and would require operators to make their own
preflight inspection before each operation. 223 Finally, the FAA would
require operators to report accidents that cause personal injury or property

213 FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 336, 126 Stat. 11, 77

(codified
at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note (2012)).
214
Id § 336(a).
215Id. § 336(c).
216

Id. § 336(b); see also sources cited supranote 119.

217See Presidential Memorandum, 80 Fed. Reg. at 9356.
218 Small Drones NPRM, 80 Fed. Reg. 9544, 9546 (proposed Feb. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 14

C.F.R. pts. 21, 43, 45, 47, 61, 91, 101, 107 & 183).
219

id.

220Id.
221

Id

222Id. The aeronautical knowledge test would need to be retaken every twenty-four months, and

the operator would also need to obtain an "unmanned aircraft operator certificate with small UAS
rating," which the FAA notes would never expire. Id.
223

Id.
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damage within ten days of the incident.2 24
As to the drones themselves, the FAA proposes requiring that the
drones be registered, but not that they obtain the airworthiness certification
required of passenger planes. 225 The drones would also need to be equipped
with requisite aircraft markings, which the FAA specifies are the "same
requirements that apply to all other aircraft., 226 Tellingly, however, the
FAA states that "[i]f [the] aircraft is too small to display markings in [the]
standard size, then the aircraft simply needs to display markings in the
largest practicable manner. '"227
In this last statement, the FAA recognizes the problem of small drones,
but then fails to solve it. Requiring "the largest practicable" 228 markings is
meaningless where even the largest practicable markings would do little to
provide notice to observers. Tiny lettering might help when a drone has
crashed or been downed, but it will do little to help victims identify the
owner or operator of a drone that commits a tort at night or while on the
move.
If the FAA's Final Rule hews to the NPRM, it would not permit
commercial drone delivery services, a limitation that brought protests from
would-be commercial-drone operators 229 such as Amazon. 3 ° Indeed,
requiring VLOS alone would make drone delivery inefficient, and
forbidding flying over anyone not involved with the flight would preclude
deliveries in all but the most sparsely inhabited locales.
The NPRM removes some uncertainty about the FAA's plans. That
said, the final rule could still be some time away, and so for the moment,
commercial operators are still left to petition the FAA for an exemption
" ' As of August 2015, more
from the ban on commercial drone operations.23
than 2,500 petitions have been filed, and the FAA has granted more than
1,000.232
224

Id.

225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 Id.

229 Scott Shane, F.A.A. Rules Would Limit Commercial Drone Use, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/16/us/faa-rules-would-limit-commercial-drone-use.html? r-2.
23 Ed Pilkington, Amazon Threatens to Take Drone Testing Abroad as US Delays Approval,

GUARDIAN (Dec. 9, 2014), bttp://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/09/amazon-threatens-drone-

testing-abroad-us-delays-approval [http://perma.cc/2SED-82J4].
231 Petitioning for Exemption Under Section 333, FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (July 24, 2015),

https://www.faa.gov/uas/legislative_programs/section333/how-to-filea_petition/
[https://perma.cc/
8QM8-2AR4]; see also Robert A. Heverly, The State of Drones: State Authority to Regulate Drones, 8
ALB. GOV'T L. REV. 29, 57 (2015) ("States have the authority to regulate their own affairs.... [s]o
long as state laws and policies are not in conflict with Constitutional guarantees or relevant federal
policies ...").
232Clay Dillow, FAA Approves More than 1,000 Commercial Drone Permits, FORTUNE (Aug. 9,
2015), http://fortune.com/2015/08/09/faa-commercial-drone-permits [http://perma.cc/CWU7-BCJM].
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Although the FAA's proposed rules would bar using drones to deliver
goods, Amazon recently petitioned for and received authority to test
"Amazon Prime Air," its plan to use delivery drones. 233 In its petition,
Amazon notes that its delivery drones can now travel at speeds over fifty
miles per hour and will carry up to five-pound payloads, a limit that
nonetheless covers eighty-six percent of Amazon's sales.234 Amazon
predicted that "[o]ne day, seeing Amazon Prime Air will be as normal as
seeing mail trucks on the road today, resulting in enormous benefits for
consumers across the nation., 235 The FAA then issued an experimental
airworthiness certificate to Amazon, permitting the company to use it for
"research and development and crew training. '236 The certificate permits
testing only of drones weighing less than fifty-five pounds, including
payload.23 7 Additionally, the certificate requires all operations to be
conducted at or below 400 feet 238 during daylight hours and in clear
weather.23 9
The FAA's experimental airworthiness certificate issued to Amazon
maintains a visual-line-of-sight requirement 24°-one of the prohibitive
provisions of the proposed rules. The certificate also requires that, subject
to a few exceptions, all operations "be conducted at least 500 feet from all
nonparticipating persons, vessels, vehicles, and structures. 241 This is
another of the proposed rules that would effectively bar Amazon from
using its drones for delivery. While these limitations will not prevent some
testing, the FAA's decision to retain them in the final rules would prevent
drones from being an attractive mode for delivery. Furthermore, it remains
to be seen how Amazon will be able to demonstrate the safety and efficacy
of its delivery drones if it is not permitted to test them in more realistic
conditions.

233Letter from Paul Misener, Vice President, Global Pub. Policy, Amazon.com, to the Honorable

Michael P. Huerta, Administrator, Fed. Aviation Admin. (July 9, 2014), https://www.faa.gov/uas/
legislativeprograms/section_333/333_authorizations/media/Amazon com 11290.pdf [https://perma.c
c/YJ5Y-TENY]; Amazon Gets Experimental Airworthiness Certificate,FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (Mar.
19, 2015), https://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsld=82225 [https://perma.cc/5PKM-UJW2].
234Letter from Paul Misener, supra note 233.
235 Id.
236

Amazon Gets Experimental Airworthiness Certificate,supranote 233.
233 Letter from John S. Duncan, Director, FAA Flight Standards Serv., to Paul Misener, Vice

President, Global Pub. Policy, Amazon.com (Apr. 8, 2015), https://www.faa.gov/uas/legislative_
[https://perma.cc/79RQprograms/section_333/333_authorizations/media/Amazon com1 1290.pdf
JF6B].

238

id.

239Amazon Gets Experimental Airworthiness Certificate,supra note 233.
240Letter from John S. Duncan, supra note 237.
141Id.

at 8-9.
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B. State Drone-RelatedLegislation

Substantive 4 2 drone-related legislation has been enacted in24 seventeen
249
245

246

24 7

Indiana, 1 Iowa,
Illinois,
Idaho,
states:2 43 Alaska, 44 Florida,
2 54
25 2
25 1
250
North Dakota,2 53 Ohio,
North Carolina,
Montana,
Louisiana,
2 60
9
25
t
2
57
2
256
Utah, 1 Virginia, and Wisconsin.
Texas,
Oregon, 255 Tennessee,

242 Several

test-site states have passed legislation appropriating funds for test-site operations. See,

e.g., Act of May 3, 2013, § 14, 2013 N.D. Laws 197, 201 (creating an "unmanned aircraft systems
fund, which must be used to defray the expenses of the operations of an unmanned aircraft systems test
site officially designated by the federal aviation administration").
243For the argument that states should take the leading role in making drone rules, see Kaminski,
supranote 85, at 67-69.
On September 9, 2015, California Governor Jerry Brown vetoed a bill, S.B. 142, that would have
enacted trespass liability for anyone flying a drone within 350 feet above real property without the
express permission of the property owner. Letter from Governor Edmund G. Brown to Members of the
California State Senate (Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.gov.ca.gov/docs/SB_142_Veto Message.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YM93-T3R5]. Although the bill would have expanded existing statutory civil trespass
liability, the strange thing to our eye is that these fights largely exist already under the California
common law of trespass. See 5 Witkin, Summary 10th (2005) Torts § 694.
244Act of July 28, 2014, ch. 105, 2014 Alaska Sess. Laws 1; Alaska Legislative Resolve No. 60
(2014), http://www.legis.state.ak.us/PDF/28/Bills/HCR015Z.PDF [http://perma.cc/6WE6-S4R5].
245Freedom from Unwarranted Surveillance Act, 2013 Fla. Laws 364.
246Act of Apr. 11, 2013, 2013 Idaho. Sess. Laws 859.
Laws 4894, 4898 (prohibiting use of drones to
24 Pub. Act No. 98-402, § 48-3(b)(10), 2013 111.
interfere with hunting or fishing); Freedom from Drone Surveillance Act, 2013 Ill. Laws 6803.
248 IND. CODE § 35-33-5-9 to -10 (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess. of 119th Gen.
Assemb. legislation).
249 Act of May 23, 2014, 2014 Iowa Acts 324.
250 LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:337 (Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.).
251Act of May 1, 2013, 2013 Mont. Laws 1509.
252 Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2014,

§§

7.16.(g),

34.30.(aHg), 2014 N.C. Sess. Laws 328, 356, 580-584; Current Operations and Capital Improvements
Appropriations Act of 2013, § 7.16.(e)-(f), 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 995, 1040.
253Act of Apr. 15, 2015, 2015 North Dakota Laws Ch. 239 (H.B. 1328).
254 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 122.98 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Files 1 to 24 of 131st Gen.
Assemb.). While it is included in this list, Ohio's legislation is arguably non-substantive. The Ohio Act
only creates the Ohio Aerospace and Aviation Technology Committee. Id § 122.98(A). The duties of
the Committee include developing strategies to "promote the aviation, aerospace, and technology
industry throughout the state, including through the commercialization of aviation, aerospace, and
technology products and ideas," encouraging "communication and resource-sharing" among interested
individuals and entities, and promoting research and development in the aviation industry, "including
research and development of unmanned aerial vehicles." Id. § 122.98(B).
255 Act of July 29, 2013, 2013-2014 Or. Laws 1869.
256Freedom from Unwarranted Surveillance Act, TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-609 (West, Westlaw
through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.); TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-4-302(a)(6) (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st
Reg. Sess.); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-901 to -907 (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.).
257Texas Privacy Act, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 3691.
258Government Use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63g-18-101 to
-105) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Gen. Sess.).
259An Act to Place a Moratorium on the Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 2013 Va. Acts 1408.
260 Act of Apr. 8, 2014, 2013 Wis. Sess. Laws 1120.
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Of these states, four-Alaska, Oregon, 26 ' Texas, and Virginia-will host
test-site operations.2 62
Virginia, 263 along with Oregon, 26 banned the installation of weapons
on government drones. North Carolina and Wisconsin similarly banned
weaponized drones, although these bans are broader, applying also to
privately owned and operated drones. 265 As we note below, these bans
make it less reasonable to perceive physical threats from drones.266 While
drones of course can pose physical threats without weapons, the legislation
at least minimizes an important variable.
North Dakota, in its wisdom, has chosen the opposite course. A law
passed in August 2015 permits the use of drones for the "patrol of national
borders" and "exigent circumstances," and only prohibits arming those
drones with lethal weapons.267 inother words, North Dakota permits police
use of drones armed with non-lethal weapons.268 Because the statute limits
weaponized drones to official use, it does not follow that this will increase
the scope of permissible self-help against drones generally, even though it
means that people may be more justified in fearing them.
The Alaska legislation has a unique feature. It requires law
enforcement to maintain a record of each flight "including the time, date,
and purpose of the flight," to establish an "auditable flight record system,"
and to "establish a method for notifying the public of the operation of an
unmanned aircraft system, unless notifying the public would endanger the
safety of a person. 26 9
Several of the statutes contain provisions aimed at protecting
individuals' privacy. North Carolina's legislation states that no individual
or entity shall use a drone to conduct surveillance of a person, a residence,
or a residence's curtilage absent the person's consent.270 Another privacyfocused provision bans the use of drones for photographing individuals,
261While Oregon will not play host to a test site of its own, the University of Alaska plans to set

up test site operations there. Press Release, FAA Selects Unmanned Aircraft Systems Research and
Test Sites (Dec. 30, 2013), http://www.faa.gov/news/press-releases/news-story.cfm?newsid=15576
[http://perma.cc/D6WW-PLM9].
262 Id.
263 An Act to Place a Moratorium on the Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems, § 1, 2013 Va. Acts
1408, 1408.
264Act of July 29, 2013, § 10, 2013-2014 Or. Laws 1869, 1871.
265 Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2014, § 14-401.24(a),
2014 N.C.
Sess. Laws 328, 582; Act ofApr. 8, 2014, § 3, 2013 Wis. Laws 1120, 1121.
266

See infra Part IV.C. 1.
267Act of Apr. 15, 2015, § 4(1)-(2), 5, 2015 North Dakota Laws Ch. 239 (H.B. 1328).
268 Cyrus Farivar, New Law Permits North Dakota Cop Drones to Fire Beanbag Rounds from the

Sky, ARs TECHNICA (Aug. 27, 2015), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/08/new-law-permits-

north-dakota-cop-drones-to-fire-bean-bag-rounds-fTom-the-sky/ [http://perma.cc/7NQW-TU32].
269ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.65.901(a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.).
270 Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2014, §

300.1(b)(1)(a), 2014 N.C. Sess. Laws 328, 581.
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absent their consent, "for the purpose of publishing or otherwise
disseminating the photograph.- 71 The provision, however, contains an
exception for "newsgathering, newsworthy events, or events or places to
which the general public is invited., 272 Another interesting aspect of the
North Carolina Act is the section regarding limitations on the use of special
imaging technology. 273 The Act states that "[c]ommercial and private
unmanned aircraft systems may be equipped with infrared or other thermal
imaging technology," but only for certain enumerated purposes, which all
relate to scientific investigation and farming or environmental
evaluations. 27 4 The Act makes it a misdemeanor to non-consensually
publish or disseminate for any purpose images recorded through use of a
that reveals "individuals,
drone with any thermal-imaging technology
275
materials, or activities inside of a structure.,
Other states, meanwhile, have recognized the privacy issue by
criminalizing various forms of spying by drone. Indiana created the crime
of "Unlawful Photography and Surveillance on Private Property. 2 76 The
Act provides that a "person who knowingly or intentionally places a
camera or electronic surveillance equipment that records images or data of
any kind while unattended on the private property of another person
without the consent of the owner or tenant of the private property"
commits a misdemeanor.2 77 Louisiana's legislation creates the crime of
' which it defines as "the
"Unlawful use of an unmanned aircraft system,"278
intentional use of an unmanned aircraft system to conduct surveillance of,
gather evidence or collect information about, or photographically or
electronically record a targeted facility without the prior written consent of
the owner of the targeted facility. '279 Having defined what seems to be a
broad privacy right, the act then goes on to limit that right severely by
defining the term "targeted facility" to mean only petroleum and alumina
refineries, chemical and rubber manufacturing facilities, and nuclear power
plants. 280 Tennessee also regulates the use of drones to capture images,
making it a misdemeanor to use a drone to "capture an image of an
individual or privately owned real property in this state with the intent to
conduct surveillance."28' 1 The statute provides a defense to prosecution,
271 Id.
272

§ 15A-300.1(b)(2).

Id.

273 Id.

§ 15A-300.1(d).

274 Id.
275 Id.

§ 14-401.25.
276Act of Mar. 26, 2014, § 26, 2014 Ind. Acts 2234, 2245.
277
Id. § 1(b).
278 LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:337 (Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.).
279Id. §
280

14:337(A).

Id.§ 14:337(B)(2).

281 TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 39-13-903(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.). Some of

the exceptions to the ban on capturing images permit a professor, employee, student, or other person
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however, where the individual destroys the image immediately upon
learning that it was captured in violation of the law, and without having
disclosed or displayed the image to any third parties. 82 Texas makes it a
crime to capture, possess, or disseminate images of nonconsenting
individuals under certain circumstances.283 The Texas statute also lists
nineteen situations in which it is permissible to capture images with
drones.284 Finally, Wisconsin deems it a misdemeanor to use a drone "with
the intent to photograph, record, or otherwise observe another individual in
a place or location where the individual has a reasonable expectation of
privacy," although this latter provision does not apply to law
enforcement.28 5
While many states limit or identify the circumstances in which an
individual may disclose images captured through use of a drone, Utah's
legislation goes further, specifically regulating the situations in which a
"nongovernmental actor may . . . disclose data acquired through an
unmanned aerial vehicle to a law enforcement agency. ' 286 Private actors
may disclose such information to law enforcement only if "the data
appears to pertain to the commission of a crime" or if the private actor, in
good faith, believes that "the data pertains to an imminent or ongoing
emergency involving danger of death or serious bodily injury to an
individual" and "disclosing the data would assist in remedying the
emergency.,

2 7

In what seems to be a rare legislative response to the privacy threat of
communication interception by drones, Indiana deems inadmissible as
evidence a "communication or an image" that is obtained through use of a
drone in violation of its drone regulations.288 Most states that have acted in
the drone-privacy area have focused on drones invading individuals'
privacy by capturing images; Indiana's approach is notable because it
responds to the equally significant threat of drones infringing on privacy
rights through interference with and interception of private
acting on behalf of an institute of higher education to capture images for purposes of research. Id. § 3913-902(a)(1). A person may capture images for purpose of mapping; an electric or natural gas utility
may capture images for certain maintenance and developmental purposes; a state agency may capture
images for certain security and emergency-response purposes; a "Tennessee licensed real estate broker"
may capture images in connection with the marketing or sale of realty, provided that no individual is
identifiable; any individual may capture images of public realty of persons on such property; and any
or entity may use a drone to capture images where permitted by the FAA. Id. § 39-13-902.
individual
22
Id. § 39-13-903(c).
283Texas Privacy Act, §§ 423.003-.004, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 3691, 3692-93.
284Id. § 423.002(a).
25 Act of Apr. 8, 2014, § 4, 2013 Wis. Sess. Laws 1120, 1121.
286UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-18-103(2) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Gen. Sess.) (emphasis
added).
287

Id. § 63G-18-103(2)(a)-(b).
28 Act of Mar. 26, 2014, § 20, 2014 id. Acts 2234, 2242.
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communications.
North Carolina's legislation establishes a detailed licensing regime for
commercial drone operators. 289 As part of its rules, North Carolina
addressed notice issues, concerns identified in this Article. The North
Carolina Division of Aviation must develop "[r]equirements for the
marking of each unmanned aircraft system operated pursuant to a license
issued under this section sufficient to permit identification of the owner of
the system and the person licensed to operate it."'29° The Division must also
develop a "system for providing agencies that conduct other operations
within regulated airspace with the identity and contact information of
licensees and the geographic areas within which the licensee is permitted
to operate" the drone. 29 ' This system for facilitating identification and
contacting of drone owners and operators will be key to responding to torts
(and crimes) committed by drones. One issue with these otherwise
laudable provisions, however, is that they only apply to drones "operated
pursuant to a license issued under this section," i.e., to drones flown for
commercial purposes. 292 The threat of tortious harm-to person, property,
or privacy-is not posed solely by commercial operators. Identification of
individuals operating drones for private purposes is equally as important.
Six states provide private, civil causes of action in cases of certain
drone-operator actions-Florida, Idaho, North Carolina, Oregon,
Tennessee, and Texas. Florida provides a cause of action to individuals
who have been surveilled by law-enforcement drones in violation of its
statute's prohibitions.293 Idaho provides a cause of action against lawenforcement officers or private individuals for the gathering of images in
violation of its statute. 294 North Carolina's legislation creates a civil cause
of action for any individual who is the subject of unwarranted surveillance
or whose- photograph is taken in violation of the state's laws. 295 The action
may be brought not only against private individuals, but also against state
agencies.2 96 Interestingly, the statute provides that, "[i]n lieu of actual
damages, the person whose photograph is taken may elect to recover five
thousand dollars ($5,000) for each photograph or video that is published or
otherwise disseminated, as well as reasonable costs and attorneys' fees and

219 Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2014, § 63-96, 2014 N.C.
Sess. Laws 328, 583-84.
290Id. § 63-96(d)(9).
Id. § 63-96(d)(10).
292Id. § 63-96(d)(9).
291

293 Freedom

from Unwarranted Surveillance Act, § 1(3), 2013 Fla. Laws 364, 365.

294Act of Apr. 11, 2013, § 21-213(2)(a)-(b), 2013 Idaho Sess. Laws 859, 859.
295 Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2014, § 15A-300.1(b),

(e), 2014
N.C. Sess. Laws 328, 581.
29 6
Id. § 15A-300.1(e).
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injunctive or other relief as determined by the court."29' 7 Oregon, in
addition to criminalizing interference with any FAA-licensed drone,
provides a cause of action for individuals harmed by such interference.2 98
The Oregon statute also creates a right of action for overflights below 400
feet if there is more than one overflight and the drone operator has been
warned. 9 9 There is a takeoff-and-landing exception to this cause of
action, 00 but where successful the statute allows for damages, an
injunction, and even attorney's fees.3 ' Oregon's statute also authorizes its
attorney general to bring actions for nuisances and trespasses arising out of
drone operations within the state.30 2 Tennessee provides a cause of action
against law-enforcement agencies that violate its statute's surveillance
prohibitions.30 3 Texas provides for a private cause of action against an
individual who captures an image of property, the property owner, or the
tenant with the intent to conduct surveillance.30 4
State statutes that create private causes of action against the operators
of drones should in theory imply a concomitant privilege of self-help.
Legislators are generally presumed to make new laws against the
background of existing laws.30 5 Thus, legislators could be presumed to
know that tort causes of action generally provide the victim with some
right of self-help, and it could therefore be argued that they should be
presumed to have intended to provide a self-help privilege.
An additional issue raised by the statutes that create a civil claim
against a government agency or official is whether those statutes permit
some form of self-help against a government drone. That is, does the fact
that a drone is operated by the Boise, Idaho Police Department instead of
the Idaho Statesman newspaper determine whether a person being
surveilled is entitled to self-help? One of the state statutes that provides
such a cause of action against public entities--Oregon's--expressly
declares that it is a crime to interfere with a government drone.30 6
297

Id.

29 Act of July 29, 2013, § 14, 2013-2014 Or. Laws 1869, 1872.
2

9"Id. § 15(1)(a)-(b).
"'aId. § 15(2)(b).
311Id. § 15(3)-(4).
30
2 Id. § 15(5).
303 Freedom from Unwarranted Surveillance Act, TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-609(e) (West,
Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.).
3' Texas Privacy Act, § 423.003(a), 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 3691, 3692.
35 Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991) ("Congress is
understood to legislate against a background of common-law adjudicatory principles. Thus, where a
common-law principle is well established . . . the courts may take it as a given that Congress has
legislated with an expectation that the principle will apply except when a statutory purpose to the
contrary is evident." (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
306Act of July 29, 2013, § 13(2), 2013-2014 Or. Laws at 1871 (declaring it a felony not just to
interfere with a government drone, but with any drone licensed by the FAA).
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As noted above, Oregon's statute creates a one-bite-rule style civil
cause of action for drone overflights below 400 feet. The landowner has a
cause of action only if there has been a previous overflight below 400 feet
following which the landowner "notified the owner or operator of the
drone that the [landowner] did not want the drone flown over the property
at a height of less than 400 feet. 30 7 On the one hand, this has the virtue of
clarifying the extent of air rights and also of rejecting the anomalous
hybrid trespass-nuisance standard of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 0 8
On the other hand, the requirement that a landowner notify a drone owneroperator as a prerequisite to suit ignores the reality that the landowner
often may have great difficulty determining the identity of the owneroperator of remotely operated private drones. (It is an interesting question
whether a landowner could satisfy the notice requirement by simply
posting a "No Drones" sign, and if so, at what angle the sign would have to
be posted to be effective.)
"No Trespassing" signs normally alter neither common-law liability
for terrestrial trespass nor change the extent to which a landowner may be
entitled to self-help. Instead, posting such a sign on land ordinarily serves
as a condition precedent to prosecution for criminal trespass, or for
enhanced criminal sanctions.30 9 In some cases the sign furnishes evidence
of mens rea-guilty knowledge that the land trod upon was privately
owned and that the owner did not invite or license the entry.3 10 Doctrinally,
therefore, a "no drones" sign would not be needed to make a drone
overflight a trespass, nor would it alter whether self-help was lawful in
"posted airspace." On the other hand, if the law were to change to permit
low-altitude drone overflights, it would be useful to have a means by
which landowners could signal that they wished to overturn that default
rule, although there is reason to doubt that a traditional sign, as opposed to
307 Id. § 15(l)(a)-(b).
305 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979) (articulating that a person is liable for a

nuisance depending on "(a) Whether the conduct involves a significant interference with the public
health, the public safety, the public peace, the public comfort or the public convenience, or (b) whether
the conduct is proscribed by a statute, ordinance or administrative regulation, or (c) whether the
conduct is of a continuing nature or has produced a permanent or long-lasting effect, and, as the actor
knows or has reason to know, has a significant effect upon the public right"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 158 (1965) (articulating that a person is liable for trespass if he "intentionally (a) enters
land in the possession of the other, or causes a thing or a third person to do so, or (b) remains on the
land, or (c) fails to remove from the land a thing which he is under a duty to remove"); see also supra
Part IH.C.2.b.
309See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 3 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 21.2(b) (2d ed. 2003) ("About a
quarter of the states mandate notice procedures with respect to all forms of real property, while about
another eighth require such notice as to all property except dwellings. All the rest draw the line at or
close to the dividing line between land (for which notice is required) and structures. This is done by

directly stating that appropriate notice is necessary as to entry of or remaining on land .... (footnotes
omitted)).
"' See id.§ 21.2(c) (explaining the required level of intent to bring charges against an intruder).

CONNECTICUTLA WREVIEW

some electronic signal or an entry in a
efficient means of achieving that end.

database,"1

[Vol. 48:1

would be the most

C. Driverless Cars
States are taking the lead in regulating driverless cars. The National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) issued a Preliminary
Statement of Policy Concerning Automated Vehicles.31 2 The Preliminary
Statement takes a cautious approach, leaving it to states-the traditional
source of most road-related rules-to regulate.3" 3 States, NHTSA
suggested, should begin permitting use of driverless cars for testing
purposes to help provide data that could guide eventual rulemaking or
legislation.3 14
So far, legislative action at the state level has been limited. But
because there are few, if any, specific bans on the operation of driverless
cars, driverless cars are arguably legal to some extent everywhere. 1 5 Four
states, California,3 16 Florida,3 17 Michigan,3 18 and Nevada,3 19 as well as the
District of Columbia,32 ° specifically permit the operation of driverless
cars-with limits. The California3 2 1 and Florida3 22 statutes expressly
declare that the state does not prohibit the operation of driverless cars.
Both Florida3 23 and Nevada3 24 require that a car capable of autonomous
311See

Megan Geuss, NoFlyZone Database Will Tell Drones Not to Fly over Your House, ARS

TECHNICA (Feb. 11, 2015, 4:58 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/02/11/noflyzone[http://perma.cc/FWC7-XRY4]
(describing
database-will-tell-drones-not-to-fly-over-your-house/
attempt to create voluntary no-fly database); see also infra notes 328-31 and accompanying text
(discussing geofencing).
312 NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF POLICY
CONCERNING AUTOMATED VEHICLES (n.d.), http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/rulemaking/pdf/Automate

dVehicles Policy.pdf.
313See id. at 10 ("[W]e believe that states are well suited to address issues such as licensing,
driver training, and conditions for operation related to specific types of vehicles.").
314See id ("NHTSA has considerable concerns ...
about detailed state regulation on safety of
self-driving vehicles, and does not recommend at this time that states permit operation of self-driving
vehicles for purposes other than testing.").
Bryant Walker Smith, Automated Vehicles Are Probably Legal in the United States, I TEX.
A&M L. REV. 411, 412-13 (2014). Building on the axiom that "what is not prohibited, is permitted,"
id. at 414 (quoting United States v. Gourde, 440 F.3d 1065, 1081 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc)), the article
notes that most state vehicle codes "assume the presence of licensed human drivers" and so do not
prohibit them directly or even indirectly, see id. at 413.
316CAL. VEH. CODE § 38750(b) (West, Westlaw through urgency legislation of Ch. 32 of 2015
Reg. Sess.).
3 7Act ofApr. 13, 2012, § 3(1), 2012 Fla. Laws 1223, 1225.
31' MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 257.244(3) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 2015, No. 130, of 2015
Reg. Sess.).
319Act of June 2, 2013, § 2.5, 2013 Nev. Stat. 2008, 2009.
310Autonomous Vehicle Act of 2012, § 3, 60 D.C. Reg. 2119, 2119-20 (Jan. 23, 2013).
3212012 Cal. S.B. 1298 § (1)(c).
322Act of Apr. 13, 2012, § 1(2), 2012 Fla. Laws at 1225.
323
Id. § 4(b).
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operation visually indicate whether it is operating in autonomous mode.
Unfortunately, both states' requirements seem intended to alert only the
human operator, given that the means of alert is to be "inside" the
vehicle.325 While there are situations where it would be vital to inform the
operator as to whether the vehicle is operating in autonomous mode or is
about to switch to manual mode, one would think that the operator usually
would be the one person who knows when the vehicle is in autonomous
mode. Surely it is at least as important to provide notice to third parties
who have no other means of determining whether the car is being driven
by a human or a computer.
IV. IMPROVING THE LAW OF HUMAN-ROBOT INTERACTIONS

It is clear that under U.S. tort law, absent a criminal statute to the
contrary, a person has a legal right to defend herself against a perceived or
actual physical threat from a robot. Other aspects of self-defense against
robots, particularly those relating to defending property or privacy, are
significantly less clear. pased on our survey above, we have identified
seven specific legal issues relating to unpleasant robot-human
interactions.3 26 Notably, each of these seven issues involves some kind of
uncertainty. Two of the issues involve uncertainty as to either the law (the
extent of the self-defense privilege in response to intrusions on seclusion)
or legal fact (the extent of the aerial boundary to property). But the other
five stem from a reasonable, ordinary person's understandable uncertainty
about robots in general and about the capabilities and intentions of the
robot they are confronted with in particular. Below we offer proposals
designed to reduce these uncertainties. Our proposals will minimize the
need for violent self-help and clarify the circumstances where it would be
appropriate.
What follows focuses on tort-law-based solutions, and on solutions
calculated to make tort-law approaches more effective. Excepting only the
case of a delivery drone, which is a sort of invitee, most private327 droneperson interactions likely will occur between legal strangers, i.e., persons
without any relevant contractual relations. This is prime territory for tort
law. As robots and drones evolve, and as reasonable expectations about
324Act of June 2, 2013, § 4(2)(b), 2013 Nev. Stat. at 2009.
325 Act of Apr. 13, 2012, § 4(l)(b), 2012 Fla. Laws at 1225 (requiring that all autonomous cars

"[h]ave a means, inside the vehicle, to visually indicate when the vehicle is operating in autonomous
mode" (emphasis added)); Act of June 2, 2013, § 4(2)(b), 2013 Nev. Stat. at 2009 (requiring all
autonomous cars to be equipped with a "visual indicator located inside the autonomous vehicle which
indicates when autonomous technology is operating the autonomous vehicle" (emphasis added)).
326See supra Part 1.
327Public uses can also be problematic. For a survey of some public use issues, see RICHARD M.
THOMPSON II, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., DOMESTIC DRONES AND PRIVACY: A PRIMER 3-5 (2015).
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robots change with them, tort law too can respond relatively quickly.
Alternative regulatory solutions are also possible, but tort-based
approaches may have the most to offer in the short run.
Tort- and notice-based solutions certainly seem preferable to
attempting to hardwire all drones to restrict them from permissible
airspace. After a toy drone landed in a tree inside of the White House
fence, its manufacturer announced "that it would issue a 'mandatory'
firmware update for its products that would contain built-in geofencing
limits-defined boundaries within which their updated, GPS-enabled
'
While geo-fencing drones offers the
drones simply would not fly."328
appealing prospect of certainty that no properly functioning machine will,
for example, attempt to overfly a nuclear power plant329 or the White
House, geofencing suffers from a number of problems. First, the
boundaries will need constant updating. The updating likely will come
from a centralized list maintained either by the government or a private
party. In either case the maintainer of that list will have unreasonably great
power to control drone use and to, for example, block legitimate uses of
drones, such as newsgathering at demonstrations.3 3 ° Second, even if we
were to adopt a geo-fencing regime, we would still need a way to deal with
failure modes--drones straying because the list was faulty, because the
drone was faulty, or because the operator ignored or overcame the
restriction.33 1
A. Clarify State Rules on Vertical Curtilage-Make a NationalRule?
Horizontally, the curtilage of a property is the area "immediately
'
In law, the curtilage is
surrounding and associated with the home."332
considered to be "part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment
' The dimensions of the equivalent aerial space above a home
purposes."333
and its horizontal curtilage-what is often referred to as vertical

32 Jay Stanley, Building Regulation into Drones, AM. CIv. LIBERTIES UNION (Apr. 22, 2015,

10:30 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-future/building-regulation-drones [http://perma.cc/R8DS7DE7].
329 See Arthur Neslen, Three Arrests Fail to Staunch Mystery of Drones Flying over French
Nuclear Plants, GUARDIAN (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/nov/06/
[http://perma.cc/PU6K-VD9G] (discussing the
arrests-myster-drones-flying-french-nuclear-plants
November 2014 arrests of individuals who flew drones near nuclear power plants in France).
...
See Stanley, supra note 328 ("[W]e want to ensure that technology remains at the service of
individuals, empowering and enriching their lives, rather than empowering those who would control
US.").
311For a discussion of how drones might be governed by code instead of law, see Henry H.
Perritt, Jr. & Eliot 0. Sprague, Lcav Abiding Drones, 16 COLuM. SCI. & TECH. L. REv. 385, 421-33
(2015).
332Florida v. Jardines, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013).
331
Id. (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984)).
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curtilage334 -- are not as clear as those of the horizontal space.335 FAA rules
on minimum navigable heights 336 also play a major part. States could in
theory set an upper bound lower than the FAA rules.337 Oregon recently set
an upper bound of 400 feet for drone overflights in certain
circumstances, 33 but this upper bound is not lower than any relevant FAA
rule because the FAA does not currently have a height rule for drones.3 39
Anything in excess of FAA rules on navigable airspace will be
preempted.34 °

As the FAA currently does not have authority to regulate hobbyist
drones,341 the main sources of regulation for non-commercial drones are
state common law and statutory law. Meanwhile, however, the people on
the ground may find it difficult to distinguish a (legal) hobbyist drone from

114 According to Brendan Peters, the U.S. Supreme Court "has never adopted the concept of
'vertical curtilage.' Instead, curtilage as viewed from above is analyzed under the Katz [v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)] reasonableness framework." Brendan Peters, Note, Fourth Amendment
Yard Work: Curtilage'sMow-Line Rule, 56 STAN. L. REv. 943, 959 n.95 (2004).
13' There is still some fundamental uncertainty about the extent of the vertical equivalent of
curtilage. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445,450 (1989) (holding that public inspection of greenhouse
from a police helicopter flying at 400 feet did not require warrant); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States,
476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (holding that observation of industrial plant from altitude of 2,000 feet above
was not akin to entering into the curtilage of a dwelling and thus did not require warrant); California v.
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986) (holding that fixed-wing observation of the curtilage from
"public navigable airspace," 1,000 feet above ground, did not require warrant); see also
Commonwealth v. Oglialoro, 547 A.2d 387, 388, 391 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988), af'd, 579 A.2d 1288 (Pa.
1990) (holding that helicopter operating in "non-navigable airspace" fifty feet above property was
intrusive and violated the Fourth Amendment's right against unreasonable warrantless searches); id at
392 (Kelly, J., concurring) (discussing "vertical curtilage," in particular explaining that surveillance
from some altitudes under 1,000 feet should not be precluded by default). In contrast, the concept of
horizontal curtilage has both "ancient and durable roots," Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414, and, the
Supreme Court tells us, "is 'easily understood from our daily experience,"' id. at 1415 (quoting Oliver,
466 U.S. at 182 n.12).
336For a discussion of the FAA rules, see supraPart H.C.2.a.
...
At some point, if the boundary were set low enough to interfere with the use and enjoyment of
the property, the state rule might infringe the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See United
States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261-62 (1946) (explaining that if flights over property deprived
landowners of the use of the property for any purpose, it would be classified as a taking).
"' Act of July 29, 2013, § 15, 2013-2014 Or. Laws 1869, 1872.
339
See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
34 See 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a)(1) (2012) ("The United States Government has exclusive
sovereignty of airspace of the United States."); City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal Inc., 411
U.S. 624, 633 (1973) ("'Federal control [of air commerce] is intensive and exclusive."' (quoting
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 303 (1944) (Jackson, J. concurring)).
341See FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 336(a)(1), 126 Stat.
11, 77 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note (2012)) ("[T]he Administrator of the Federal Aviation
Administration may not promulgate any rule or regulation regarding a model aircraft, or an aircraft
being developed as a model aircraft, if ... the aircraft is flown strictly for hobby or recreational
use .. ").To address the FAA's lack of authority to regulate hobbyist drones, Senator Diane Feinstein
has proposed legislation that would give the FAA such authority and require it to make rules to ensure
the safe operation of hobbyist drones. See Consumer Drone Safety Act, S.1608, 114th Cong. (2015).
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an (illegal) low-flying commercial newsgathering or paparazzi drone.342
Thus, they may have a hard time determining their right of self-help. Other
than this, at present, the problem of vertical curtilage is not acute.
Nevertheless, it is only a matter of time before the FAA permits drone
flights over roads, public spaces, and homes 3 43-with minimum altitude
allowance remaining the sole issue. States, or preferably Congress, could
avoid both confusion and litigation if they were to establish a clear
minimum height restriction for drone overflights of private property that
covered both hobbyist 3" and commercial drones.345
B. Clarify the Right to Self-Defense in Response to Intrusionon Seclusion
As noted above, we have found no cases delineating the extent of the
privilege for self-help in the face of an intrusion on seclusion.346 Logic and
the general sweep of tort law suggest that reasonable self-help should be
privileged, but as noted above, it is remarkably difficult to determine how
much force would be reasonable given the very great uncertainties about a
robot's--especially a drone's-spying capabilities and intentions. In the
short term, that uncertainty likely will be found to justify quite energetic
self-help efforts. States should provide some guidance or else people may
shoot first and ask questions later. This guidance could come by statute, or
courts could provide it. In either case, given the difficulties of determining
from the ground what a drone is doing or is capable of, one rule that might
be worth considering is a presumption that a drone is observing those
below-and thus intruding on seclusion-unless the drone makes clear
somehow that it is not doing so.

342To the extent that genuine news-gatherers are regulated more stringently than hobbyists who
present no greater danger or disruption to the people and property below, the news-gatherers might
have a quite substantial First Amendment claim as well. For a slightly contrary view, see Rivera v.
Foley, No. 3:14-cv-00196, 2015 WL 1296258, at *2, *9 (D. Conn. Mar. 23, 2015) (holding that
officers had qualified immunity from a claim that they unlawfully restricted journalist's use of drone to
hover 150 feet above a crime scene because the First Amendment right to record police activity was not
clearly established). But see Eugene Volokh, No Drone Surveillance of Crime Scene (Even from 150
Feet Above), Police Say, WASH. POST (Mar. 30, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2015/03/30/no-drone-surveillance-of-crime-scene-even-from- 150-feet-above-policesay/ [http://perma.cc/H4R3-XW4L] (criticizing the First Amendment analysis in Rivera v. Foley).
Note that the overflight issue is distinct from the delivery issue. If an Amazon drone or a
...
TacoCopter is making a delivery in response to an order, the homeowner has presumably consented to
the intrusion and there is thus no trespass issue. Any relevant FAA rules would still apply (surprise
gifts raise trickier issues).
I" Note that while the FAA does not have authority to regulate hobby drones, see FAA
Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 § 336, Congress does, subject only to whether this would be a
genuine regulation of interstate commerce.
34
See Troy A. Rule, Airspace in an Age of Drones,95 B.U. L. REV. 155, 187-197 (2015).
3' See supra Part II.D.
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C. Reduce UncertaintyAbout Robots Generally
A person confronted with a robotic trespasser, a robot that might be a
spy, or a property-damaging robot, will in many cases have genuine and
understandable doubts about the robot's capabilities and intentions. When,
as a result of this uncertainty, a person assumes the worst about what the
robot is doing or is going to do, her understandable lack of information
about what the robot is capable of will-under some circumstancesprovide a basis for a legal judgment that her belief was, in law,
reasonable.347 Ordinarily, when confronted with new technologies, people
fear them.3 48 When a technology is experimental or even just new, the
social expectations needed to define a reasonable standard of care do not
exist. As the use of the technology is abnormal, the risk is high that courts
will find, or allow juries to find, that it is reasonable for people or even
animals 3 49 to be afraid of the technology.35 ° Because negligence is often
measured against customary behavior, and new technology involves a
departure from custom,3"' one would expect that robots, at least for a
while, will be reasonably held to appear to pose greater threats than they
actually do. At least for the near future, so long as the public remains
unfamiliar with, and potentially uncomfortable around, robots, judges and
juries will likely find-and would be justified in finding-that a
14' For an example of one citizen's reaction to finding a drone outside her window, see Kathryn
A. Wolfe, Dianne Feinstein Spots Drone Inches from Face, POLITICO (Jan. 15, 2014, 4:15 PM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/01/senator-dianne-feinstein-encounter-with-drone-technologyprivacy-surveillance-102233.html [http://perma.cc/73CJ-D3CM].
348 See supra Part II.C.2 (remarking that the novelty of drones will tend to result in more selfhelp); see also Martin Bauer, 'Technophobia': A Misleading Conception of Resistance to New
Technology, in RESISTANCE TO NEW TECHNOLOGY: NUCLEAR POWER, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY,
AND BIOTECHNOLOGY 97 (Martin Bauer ed., 1995) (describing fear regarding initial development of
railroad and nuclear power technology); ULRIKE BARTHELMESS & ULRICH FURBACH, DO WE NEED
ASIMOV'S LAWS? 5 (2014), http://arxiv.org/pdf/1405.0961vl.pdf [http://perma.cc/RVF6-LX68] ("The
technical development in engineering, mining, chemistry and transportation resulted in a dominance of
machines, which often was felt as a threat. There was a kind of technophobia which even resulted in
fights against machines."); Brian David Johnson, The Four Stages of Introducing New Technologies,
SLATE (Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/futuretense/2012/01/newtech
nologies enter our lives and societyin four stages_.html [http://perma.cc/4NPJ-HGU2].
141 See Kyle Graham, Of Frightened Horses and Autonomous Vehicles: Tort Law and Its
Assimilation of Innovations, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1241, 1247-50 (2012) (noting that in early
automobile cases, the "mere operation of a vehicle likely to frighten horses on a public highway created
a jury question as to whether [the defendant] breached his duty of reasonable care," but that "courts
swiftly and soundly rejected [this] view").
...
See, e.g., Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of PublicRisk Management in
the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 277, 307-08 (1985) (arguing that courts prefer familiar hazards to new
ones); Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Torts and Innovation, 107 MICH. L. REv. 285, 291 (2008)
(arguing that tort law has a bias against innovation).
"' See Parchomovsky & Steih, supra note 350, at 294. This view has its critics, particularly those
who see tort law as more efficient, or at least more efficient than alternatives based on regulation. See,
e.g., Mary L. Lyndon, Tort Law and Technology, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 137 (1995).
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' Seeing fear
heightened level of caution and suspicion was "reasonable."3 52
and caution as reasonable will thus tend to push judges and juries towards
accepting a more muscular form of self-defense than society as a whole
might decide to find reasonable once robots have become domesticated and
commonplace-and it is likely to be a higher level than robot owners and
operators would like.
It is not surprising that the introduction of a potentially dangerous new
technology into homes, offices, and public spaces might create some
uncertainty. But if indeed uncertainty is the feature common to each of
these legal problems, then it follows that the way to eliminate the
problems, or at least reduce their severity, will be to remove or reduce the
degree of uncertainty reasonably felt by people who have unexpected or
unwanted encounters with robots.
In general, uncertainty about robots will be reduced either by (1)
limiting the capabilities that robot makers may legally give their creations,
or (2) by creating practical or legal mechanisms by which robots clearly
announce their presence, capabilities, and, perhaps, intentions. In some
cases, robot operators could be incentivized to give proper notice by
creating a legal presumption that it is reasonable to assume that a robot that
does not give notice of its harmlessness in some standardized fashion is in
fact dangerous.

1. ProhibitArmed Robots
Assuming there are no Second Amendment issues involved, 353 it would
be entirely proper for state legislatures or Congress to make rules
forbidding equipping robots with weaponry such as guns or anti-personnel
devices, such as Tasers.3 54 A blanket national or international355 rule

352 An alternate possibility is that courts might consider the operation of a dangerous robot in

inhabited areas to be an "ultrahazardous activity." An "ultrahazardous activity" is an activity that
necessarily involves a risk of serious harm, which cannot be eliminated by the exercise of the utmost
care and that is not a matter of common usage. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
313The Second Amendment issue would not be the robot's right to be armed, but rather the robotowners' right to an armed robot. Given that robots operate at a remove from their controller, not to
mention potentially autonomously, one could be forgiven for wondering how one could seriously argue
that deploying an armed robot was "bearing arms" in a constitutional sense. For an attempt nonetheless
to do just that, see Dan Terzian, The Right to Bear (Robotic) Arms, 117 PENN. ST. L. REv. 755, 757-58
(2013) (proposing, inter alia, a reinterpretation of Districtof Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008),
that would protect a right to possess even non-"wearable" arms).
" Equipping robots with weaponry is, alas, far from a fantastic suggestion. See, e.g., SXSW2014:
Stun Gun Drone Zaps Intern, YouTUBE (Mar. 7, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v
=M IKdNCMWbU4 (providing video of a Taser-equipped drone built by the Chaotic Moon corporation
delivering an 80,000 volt shock to a volunteer, who was the fim's intern); Susanna Kim, Texas StartUp Tasers Intern Via Stun-Copter to Spark Discussion About Tech at SXSW, ABC NEWS (Mar. 10,
2014), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/intem-tasered-drone-sxsw-explains-feels-zapped/story?id=2284
8505 (discussing incident at SXSW where Chaotic Moon used Taser-equipped drone to stun intern).
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making it illegal to arm a robot would make it far less reasonable for a
person to fear that a robot was intending to attack her. It is always possible
that a rogue robot hobbyist might have equipped Robby with a six-shooter
or a stun gun, but without some reason to believe Robby is packing, it will
in all but
the most exceptional cases be unreasonable to fear that sort of
35 6
attack.
Prohibiting armed robots will have the additional virtue of weakening
the case for finding that operation of robots outside the lab is an
ultrahazardous activity. There are substantial reasons to think that
operating an armed robot might be ultrahazardous, starting with the fact
that robots may be designed to be dangerous to people. Even if the robot is
completely under the control of the remote operator, there is always a
chance that someone might jam the controls, hack the robot's software, or
that it might malfunction in some manner. If the armed robot has any sort
of autonomy that could conceivably include fire control, the science fiction
plots write themselves. The legal system is likely to be very sensitive to
these possibilities regardless of the safety precautions included in the
robot's design.
2.

Give Notice of Robot Capabilities

Even if robots are unarmed (or disarmed), other concerns, including
the fear of being rolled over by a robot or the fear of a drone crash, may
still rise to the level of reasonableness. Personal safety fears that do not
prove to be grounded in fact should be cured by time. In the case of robots,
however, time alone will provide only a partial cure for uncertainty as to
what a given robot can do. It is likely that certain types of robotsautonomous cars for example-will be branded in a manner that makes
them distinct. They will have recognizable shapes and bear distinctive
corporate logos. Perhaps some day human drivers will become so rare that
they will have to give warning that a human-controlled vehicle is coming.
At present, however, autonomous mode is the exception, so a car capable
of driving itself should indicate when it is in autonomous mode. This
would allow cautious or fearful drivers to keep the driverless vehicle at a
distance.
If, in the future, Google self-driving cars have an excellent safety
record after hundreds of thousands or millions of miles on the road, then it
...Autonomous Weapons: An Open Letter from AI & Robotics Researchers, FUTURE OF LIFE

INST., http://futureoflife.org/AI/open_letter-autonomousweapons [http://perma.cc/E5UY-GXBA] (last
visited Oct. 12, 2015) (containing a letter signed by more than 2,900 Al/robotics researchers and more
than 1,700 other persons urging an international ban on autonomous weapons).
356 For discussions of the viewpoint that automatic weapons system bans are required by
international law, see Peter Asaro, Jus Nascendi, Robotic Weapons and the Martens Clause, in ROBOT
LAW, supra note 19; see also Rebecca Crootof, The Killer Robots Are Here: Legal and Policy
Implications, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1837, 1872-75 (2015).
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should become progressively less reasonable to fear them. On the other
hand, if Google self-driving cars were to become known for carrying
automated Wi-Fi sniffers that attempt to break into every private network
they pass,35 7 it would become very reasonable to worry every time one
passed, not to mention if one tarried in front of the house. Even after most
people become familiar enough with robots to associate various
capabilities with different types of robots, as much as most people today
can distinguish between a bus and a backhoe, there will still be issues of
perception and identification, particularly with regard to aerial robots.
From an economic perspective, the robot operator is clearly the leastcost avoider in this scenario: it would be far more expensive to expect
every landowner and occupier to invest in gear capable of discerning the
particulars of every robot flying overhead. The overall cost to society
would be much less if the robot operator had the burden of advertising the
robot's capabilities through markings, lights, or other means. Indeed, in
order to shift the costs to this least-cost avoider, it might be sensible to
create a general presumption that drones that fail to advertise their
harmlessness are reasonably assumed to be dangerous to person or privacy.
Thus, the best way to create a balance-to ensure that drones are not
unduly attacked and that people are only duly worried about what drones
are doing-is to standardize how drones-and other robots as welldeclare their capabilities and intentions, thus changing what fears are
legally and morally reasonable. A drone with cameras or Wi-Fi sensors is a
greater privacy threat than one lacking means of recording or transmitting
personal information. The ordinary person, however, cannot be expected to
evaluate the potential harmfulness of a drone as it buzzes along at thirty
feet in the air, much less a hundred.
Mandatory-and effective-notice is thus critical both ex-ante and expost. 358 Ex-ante notice enables more accurate warnings of what the robot is
able to do, thus informing-or defanging-threat assessment. Whatever
rules are adopted, society will need standards defining both robot
harmlessness and common types of danger, and standardized means of
advertising both harmlessness and dangerousness. Developing these
grammars may be especially challenging for robots with some autonomy,
and even more so for those capable of emergent behavior. In addition, ex357Although it did not involve robots or self-driving cars, Google's national mapping initiative
included a secret program to capture information about not only the location of public Wi-Fi networks
but even private Wi-Fi networks and the traffic carried on those networks. See David Kravets, An
Intentional Mistake: The Anatomy of Google's Wi-Fi Sniffing Debacle, WIRED (May 2, 2012, 7:18
PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/05/google-wifi-fcc-investigation/ [http://perma.cc/8GKC2E2F].
...Despite their critics, notice regimes remain valuable. See M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice
Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1027, 1071 (2012) (exploring
arguments for and against mandatory notice).
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post notice combined with a licensing regime will help connect a
malfeasant robot to its owner or operator.
a. Ex-Ante Notice: Warnings
The idea of enacting legal rules requiring the operator of scary new
technology to warn the public about it is far from new. The poster child for
what now seems like excessive warning is likely the so-called Red Flag
Act of 1865,"' which required:
Every Locomotive propelled by Steam or any other than
Animal Power on any Turnpike Road or public Highway [to
have at least three drivers or conductors] . . .[O]ne of such
Persons, while any Locomotive is in motion, shall precede
such Locomotive on Foot by not less than Sixty Yards, and
shall carry a Red Flag constantly displayed, and shall warn
the Riders and Drivers of Horses of the Approach of such
Locomotives, and shall signal the Driver thereof when it shall
Horses, and Carriages
be necessary to stop, and shall assist
3 60
same.
the
passing
Horses,
by
drawn
The original Red Flag rule lasted seventeen years, being amended in 1878
to require the flagman to be only twenty yards in front of a motorcar. 361 It
seems silly now, but in its day, the Red Flag Act may have seemed a
reasonable response to the risk of stampeding livestock that could be
terrified by the loud noises and occasional steam blasts from early boiler
engines.362
The Red Flag Act had another provision, however, that looks
increasingly modem. In addition to the flagman, the Act required lights:
"Sixthly, any Person in charge of any such Locomotive shall provide Two
efficient Lights to be affixed conspicuously, One at each Side on the Front
of the same, between the Hours of One Hour after Sunset and One Hour
before Sunrise. 3 63 The idea of requiring cars, and now planes and
9 Locomotives Act 1865, 28 & 29 Vict. c. 83 (Eng.).
360Id. § 3.
361 See

Highways and Locomotives (Amendment) Act 1878, 41 & 42 Vict. c. 77, § 29 (Eng.)

(amending section 3 of Locomotives Act 1865). The Act made no distinction between automobiles and
locomotives.
362 ARVID

LINDE,

PRESTON

TUCKER

AND OTHERS:

TALES

OF BRILLIANT

AUTOMOTIVE

INNOVATORS & INNOVATIONS 113 (2011). In fact, however, "[a] Parliamentary committee in 1873
determined that a man walking 60 yards ahead of a car and waving a red flag was not particularly
effective since roads were often busy enough with horses and carts and bicycles and whatnot that the
man got lost in the traffic. Also, waving a red flag on busy streets tended to frighten horses more than it
warned their owners of an approaching danger." The New London to New Brighton Antique Auto Run,
SOLIVANT, http://www.solivant.com/oldcars/ [http://perma.cc/TQC8-9JHQ] (last visited Aug. 15,

2015).

363Locomotives Act 1865, 28 & 29 Vict. c. 83, § 3 (Eng.).
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helicopters, to have running lights when operating in the dark lives on and
needs to be extended to any robots that will travel outdoors, especially
aerial ones.
In order for a person to be able to make an accurate threat assessment
of a trespassing or nearby robot, something must warn that person of the
robot's capabilities or give accurate indication of its relative harmlessness.
A solid blue light, for example, might indicate the absence of any
surveillance device; flashing red and blue could mean a police drone (don't
shoot that); other colors might indicate various surveillance capabilities.
Placing the duty on the drone owner by requiring a declaration of
harmlessness in order to enjoy a safer-but perhaps not entirely safeharbor would follow the precedent set by the international conventions
regulating civilian aircraft.36" Similarly, a rule requiring clear markings and
lights to distinguish official robots from civilian ones would follow the
precedents that restrict distinctive lighting combinations to emergency
vehicles and law enforcement. Currently, no international standard for car
and truck emergency and police lights exists,365 and indeed domestic U.S.
practices vary somewhat by state or even locality,366 but one of the
advantages of writing a rule now, before large numbers of drones are
manufactured and deployed, is that a consistent national (and, ideally,
" Under international humanitarian law, medical aircrafls that identifythemselves during armed
conflict by using a flashing blue light are entitled to protection and even special assistance and landing
rights. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts annex 1 art. 6, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3,
50; id. arts. 24, 30, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 16, 18. For a general discussion of the (relatively narrow)
application of international law of armed conflict to the marking of remotely piloted vehicles, see Ian
Henderson, InternationalLaw Concerning the Status and Marking of Remotely Piloted Aircraft, 39
DENV.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 615,619-21 (2011).
365 Although the UN Convention on Road Traffic annex 5 42, Nov. 8, 1968, 1042 U.N.T.S. 17,
59 and also UN Regulation No. 65, E/ECE/324/Rev.1/Add.64/Rev.2/Amend.1 IN 1.1, 2.1 discuss the
use of blue and amber as "special warning lamps" and red, white, or blue for flashing lamps, there is no
effective international standard color for emergency vehicles, and there are still many countries with
other systems even in the EU. "There is currently no uniform approach among all 27 Member States on
the colour and use of emergency lights on ambulances and fire engines; the colour used may differ
from one Member State to the other." Eur. Parl., Comm. on Petitions, Notice to Members, Petition
1268/2011 by Alberto Lemos da Silva (Port.) (May 30, 2012) (complaining of non-uniformity of
Spanish emergency vehicles).
366See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 25259 (West, Westlaw through urgency legislation of Ch. 807 of
2015 Reg. Sess.) (allowing authorized emergency vehicles to display flashing amber warning lights);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-4-213(2) (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.) (requiring
flashing or oscillating red for emergency vehicles and reserving them for their use and permitting blue,
white, or blue in combination with white as optional additions); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-96p,
14-96q (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess. and June Spec. Sess.) (reserving flashing white for
officially permitted uses including volunteer ambulances and flashing red for various fire vehicles and
vehicles transporting students with disabilities); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-1025(C) (West, Westlaw
through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (permitting funeral procession vehicles to use purple warning lights); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 46.37.190(1) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (requiring that authorized
emergency vehicles be equipped with at least one red light and siren).
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international) standard could be set.
This last point bears emphasis: the perfect time to establish a national
standard for mobile robot warning lights is now, before there is a
substantial installed civilian base without standard warning equipment.
The more that private owners deploy aerial drones or land-based mobile
robots without standard lights, the greater the cost of retrofitting the lights
later---or the larger the class of unlighted and grandfathered-in robots,
potentially undermining the effectiveness of any warning system.
An alternative but more expensive rule would be to require that drones
at least-and perhaps autonomous land- and water-based robots alsocarry something akin to the automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast
(ADS-B) transponders currently required for aircraft.367 This device would
broadcast information including a unique identification number, location,
altitude, velocity, and perhaps basics about the capabilities of the robot.
Transponders have advantages and disadvantages over colored lights in
that a transponder sends alphanumeric information, which can be detected
from farther away, and when decoded is easier to record and harder to
misread than a light.368 The information-bearing potential of lights is also
reduced by the color blindness of a substantial fraction of the population.3 69
On the other hand, decoding transponder information requires equipment
not commonly found in the home.37 ° Even if that equipment were issued to
first responders, flying intruders, at least, might be long gone before the
reader reached the scene. Transponders, however, are expensive37'
(although the readers less so372), and are substantially heavier than a few
small LED lights.
Yet another possibility would be to require RFID chips in drones, as
367See 14 C.F.R. § 91.225 (2015) (defining ADS-B requirements for aircraft and requiring that

aircraft carry them by 2020).
368 ADS-B Frequently Asked Questions, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., http://www.faa.gov/nextgen/
programs/adsb/faq/ [http://perma.cc/3DS3-CSCG] (last visited Sept. 4, 2015).
369 See Ananya Mandal, Color Blindness Prevalence, NEWS MED. (Feb. 5,

2014),

[http://perma.cc/9NKT-76GR]
http://www.news-medical.net/health/Color-Blindness-Prevalence.aspx
("According to 2006 estimates from the Howard Hughes Medical Institute, around 7.0% of the male
population and 0.4% of the female population cannot differentiate between red and green or they
perceive red and green differently to other people.").
370Another, far too expensive, alternative would be to set up a national grid akin to air-traffic
control for drones.
371 Current prices for an ADS-B transponder for an aircraft are about $10,000. See Jim Moore,
Many Choices for ADS-B Equipage, AOPA (Mar. 28, 2013), http://www.aopa.org/News-and[http://perma.cc/EGB6-89CJ].
Video/All-News/2013/March/28/Many-choices-for-ADS-B-equipage
Less capable transponders are less expensive, with Mode C transponders selling for under $2,000.
Featured Mode C Transponders, SARASOTA AVIONICS INT'L, http://sarasotaavionics.com/category/

transponders/mode-c-transponders [http://perma.cc/889X-Y2FM] (last visited Sept. 4, 2015).
372 See, e.g., Encoders, WINGS & WHEELS, http://wingsandwheels.com/avionics-instruments/
transponders/encoders.html [http://perma.cc/RRA7-9F2H] (last visited Aug. 15, 2015) (pricing
encoders at around $300).
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these are much lighter weight.373 Passive RFID chips are much less
expensive than transponders,374 but their range is also much shortercommonly, only a few meters.3 75 Battery-powered RFID tags, however,
already can achieve a range of up to 300 feet.376 RFID readers cost about
37 7
$500.
Until the ordinary person has an RFID reader, this solution too
will be of limited value.
The lowest-cost, but also only partially effective, real-time notice
alternative would be to require drones, and especially indoor and landbased robots, to bear distinctive exterior markings giving notice of their
capabilities. The marking strategy might be as simple as having a reserved
safe-harbor color for robots that record no information about their
surroundings, or it could be as complicated as developing a national or
international code for robot capabilities somewhat like the widely used
U.S. road symbols. 378 A suitable pictogram-based marking strategy could,
in the best case, convey important information quickly, but would not be
effective in all scenarios.
The fuselage-marking option has the great disadvantage of being of
little value at night. Markings on most drones, not to mention on the
smaller ones, would be hard to discern once the drones achieved any
substantial altitude. On the other hand, markings might work better for
land-based robots, and they could work particularly well for robots that
would be used in situations where people would likely encounter the robot
repeatedly, such as a household or office robot.
b. Ex Post Notice: Robot Identification
When, by accident or plan, a robot has harmed a person or property,
the victim will need a way to trace the robot to the party responsible for the
damages.3 79 For remotely controlled robots, the responsible party will
usually be the robot's operator or owner. Other scenarios are possible,
313Active vs. Passive RFID, JOvLx, http://atlasrfid.com/jovix-education/auto-id-basics/active-rfidvs-passive-rfid/ [http://perma.cc/U8DN-6QC6] (last visited Sept. 4, 2015).
374Id.
375Id.
37 6

RFID Frequently Asked Question: From How FarAway Can a Typical RFID Tag Be Read?,
RFID J., http://www.rfidjoumal.com/faq/show?139 [http://perma.cc/E4FF-F3MJ] (last visited Aug. 15,
2015).
371RFID Frequently Asked Question: How Much Do RFID Readers Cost Today?, RFID
JOURNAL, http://www.rfidjournal.com/faq/show?86 [http://perma.cc/6RVP-SX8A] (last visited Aug.
15, 2015).
37' For a list, see U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., MANUAL ON UNIFORM TRAFFIC CONTROL DEVICES

(2009), http://mutcd.fhwa.dot.gov/pdfs/2009rlr2/mutcd2009rlr2edition.pdf
[http://perma.cc/P4CGECL5]; see also National Standards for Traffic Control Devices; the Manual on Uniform Traffic
Control Devices for Streets and Highways; Revision, 74 Fed. Reg. 66730 (Dec. 16, 2009) (describing
changes from earlier edition).
9 See, e.g., Act of July 29, 2013, § 15(b), 2013-2014 Or. Laws 1869, 1872 (requiring trespass
victims to give notice to drone owner before cause of action accrues).
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however. For example, if the injury was due to a design or manufacturing
defect in a mass-produced robot, then under basic product liability rules the
manufacturer and seller would be liable instead of the owner. If the robot
has indicia of a manufacturer, as does a modem car or boat, that will
suffice to trace a responsible party. Even in this case, however, the thirdparty victim would still be entitled to sue the owner or operator who would
then have to sue the manufacturer or seller. There will be few if any robotharm scenarios, however, in which the victim would have no claim at all
against either the owner or operator except for those (1) where the robot
was blameless and the harm was in fact caused by a third party;38 (2) a
third-party interferes with or takes control of the robot and the owner or
operator is blameless for failing to prevent it; or (3) the owner or operator
herself is the victim.
For autonomous robots, the responsible party will in the most common
cases be the owner. There are, however, esoteric possibilities that go
beyond the scope of this Article. For example, imagine a gardening robot,
with significant autonomy, capable of learning from experience. Imagine
further that the robot owner's neighbor has been teaching the robot silly
robot tricks while the owner is at work. In the course of demonstrating the
robot trick, while both the owner and the neighbor are away, the robot
injures a worker who has come to deliver something. Depending on the
facts and on one's theories of responsibility and deterrence, one might
assign responsibility for this tort to the neighbor, the owner, the robot's
programmer, the robot's designer, and/or the robot's manufacturer.3 81
Setting up a licensing regime and national or state-based registries
would help connect a malfeasant robot to its owner or user. Unfortunately,
no single system is likely to work in all circumstances. Because drones can
be small and may be used outdoors in low-light situations, license plates or
airplane-style markings alone may be poor solutions. Conversely, license
plates or markings should work well for larger and purely terrestrial robots.
The RFID and transponder regimes discussed above382 require detection
gear and may not be effective if the robot does not remain at the scene of
the injury.
Even if they are not always visible, giving flight-capable robots an
equivalent to aircraft tail markings would at least provide some means of
connecting robots to responsible parties. Land-based robots, and perhaps
airborne ones also, could be required to carry a standardized internal
marking equivalent to Vehicle Identification Numbers (VINs). NHTSA has
required that all cars sold in the United States since model year 1981 carry
380For example, if a third party pushes the robot onto the victim.
38 Scenarios like this make one doubt projections about the future shortfalls in lawyer

employment, at least until robots themselves can do the work.
382 See supra notes 367-68 and accompanying text.
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a seventeen-character VIN,3833 and
the rule has since been extended to other
84
vehicles and certain car parts.
Requiring the equivalent of VINs on mobile robots and creating an
owner's registry would not only help identify the responsible party in the
case of robot torts, but would also have the side-benefits of helping deter
robot thefts and of making it easier to reunite owners with stolen robots
after they were recovered. Interestingly, NHTSA's authority to issue a
safety standard requiring standardized VINs has been upheld on the
grounds that the requirement contributed to vehicle safety (indirectly) by
reducing errors in compiling data on motor vehicle crashes that could be
used to understand safety problems, support future safety standards, and
help trace stolen vehicles.3 85 As this Article went to press, the FAA
announced it was creating a task force to develop recommendations for
required registration of drones.386
387
A better solution, inspired somewhat by Alaska's drone legislation,
would be to require drones or drone operators to file flight logs. For travel
over urban or other sensitive areas, the flight plan requirement might be
ex-ante, just as current pilots must file a flight plan before takeoff. In other
cases, however, one might require real-time transmissions for drones of a
certain size or value and post-flight filing of time-stamped position data for
others. Both would require mandating an on-board GPS-based positionlogging device, akin to the wrist-watch-sized devices available today for
runners and bicyclists.388 The data could be provided to the public in
searchable form like existing real-time flight trackers for manned
aircraft.389 Indeed, NASA and Verizon are developing technology to use
383 Vehicle
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NAT'L HIGHWAY

TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN.,

http://www.nhtsa.gov/Vehicle+Safety/Vehicle-Related+Theft/Vehicle+ldentification+Numbers
+(VINs) [http://perma.cc/JYQ7-T4LK] (last visited Aug. 15, 2015). The National Motor Vehicle Title
Information System, operating under the authority of the U.S. Department of Justice by the American
Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, maintains and tracks motor vehicle title histories. 49
U.S.C. §§ 30502, 30503 (2006).
3 Vehicle Identification Numbers (VINs), supra note 383.
385 Vehicle Equip. Safety Comm'n v. NHTSA, 611 F.2d 53, 54 (4th Cir. 1979); see also New
York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 111-12 (1986) (discussing advantages of VINs including reducing the
number of people not compensated for accidents, working with state registration and safety
requirements, and concluding that because VINs help identify stolen autos, which are
disproportionately involved in accidents, "the VIN safeguards not only property but also life and
limb").
38
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Requirement, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP. (Oct. 19, 2015), https://www.transportation.gov/briefingroom/us-transportation-secretary-anthony-foxx-announces-unmannedaircraft-registration
[https://per
ma.cc/DW9N-KG8P].
387See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
388Email from Edward Hasbrouck to author (May 26, 2014) (on file with author).
389 See, e.g., FLIGHTRADAR24, http://www.flightradar24.com (last visited Aug. 15, 2015)
(providing a real-time searchable online flight tracking service).
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cellphone towers to monitor the location of low-altitude drones.3 90
3. Recommendation: A Mixed Approach
In light of these considerations, we suggest a mixed approach in which
all mobile robots391 would be required to carry warning markings, lights,
and the equivalent of a VIN that would be recorded in a state or national
registry. We do not recommend the RFID chip solution as readers are not
in common use, and, in any case, the detection range is not yet adequate.
Drones capable of carrying a camera or other sensor should be required to
carry a sealed position-logging device that timestamps the drone's location,
and the operator should be required to file flight plans, either in real time,
if practicable, and otherwise within twenty-four hours of flight.
No discussion of a notice regime would be complete without some
discussion of cheating. Notice regimes are ineffective when there are a
sufficient number of bad actors. In a world with widespread cheating,
notice is not reliable, so it becomes more reasonable to look at all drones as
potential threats. Even a relatively small number of bad actors-or liarscan undermine a notice regime if they cause dangerous false reliance.
Enforcement of disclosure rules for robots in general, and drones in
particular, will be difficult, but civil and even criminal penalties for false
statements may be in order. Were society to transition to a legal regime in
which the default rule privileged reasonable self-defense, but the owneroperator's standardized and intelligible declaration of harmlessness made
self-defense presumptively unreasonable, then a false statement of
harmlessness should be considered fraud or worse. We propose that
misidentifying a robot not only be tortious, but also subject the responsible
party to a criminal penalty comparable to that for falsifying or obscuring a
license plate,3 92 and that the penalty for falsifying or altering a robot's
internal unique identification number be equivalent to the penalty for
altering a VIN. 393

390 Mark Harris, NASA and Verizon Plan to Monitor US Drone Network from Phone Towers,

GUARDIAN (June 3, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jun/03/verizon-nasa-dronescellphone-towers [http://perma.cc/K5YD-268S].
9' One could limit it to mobile robots that operated outside the owner's property, but that would
fail to cover the cases of robots operating on properties where tradespeople and members of the public
might be invited to enter.
392See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 20 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 3 of 2014 Reg. Sess.) (making it
a crime to make a false statement in applying for a license plate).
391See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2321 (2012) ("Whoever buys, receives, possesses, or obtains control of,
with intent to sell or otherwise dispose of, a motor vehicle or motor vehicle part, knowing that an
identification number for such motor vehicle or part has been removed, obliterated, tampered with, or
altered, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.").
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V. ROBOT RIGHTS AGAINST PEOPLE

People have significant rights and privileges permitting them to defend
themselves against various physical, property, and privacy harms that
might be committed by robots. These rights, however, are not unlimited.
The existence of limits on human rights to self-defense tells that there must
be cases where, in effect, the robots have a right not to be harmed. We
hasten to add that today "robot rights" can only be shorthand for the rights
of the robots' owners or the owner's agents. In law, at present, a robot has
the same rights as a sock.3 9 4 Perhaps someday robots will achieve or
simulate sentience to the point where society recognizes them as legitimate
holders of some bundle of rights, be it those held by animals, citizens, or
something in between. At present, however, the idea of "robot rights" is in
fact only a proxy for "robot-owner's rights."
Even so, we can deduce some correlatives395 from the description of
when people are privileged to fight back and when they are not. In
Hohfeldian terms, when the state creates a right for one person, it creates a
corresponding duty to respect that right on one or more others.3 96 Similarly,
if the state gives a person a privilege to act, it disables others from making
legal complaints if that privilege is exercised.397 We have seen that a
person has a privilege to self-defense against robots if the robot attacks her
or if she reasonably believes the robot is about to harm her. The same
holds true for threats to third parties. The only limit on this privilege is that
the belief must be objectively reasonable, in that a judge or jury would find
that a reasonable person could have believed it under the circumstances.
Thus, the correlative right of a robot-recall, this is shorthand-is to not be
injured by persons who unreasonably believe the robot is dangerous.
Regarding threats to and damage to property, the calculation is more
complicated. People have a privilege to damage a robot to protect property,
but only so long as the property being protected reasonably seems more
" See Richards & Smart, supra note 19.
...
See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some FundamentalLegal Conceptionsas Applied in
JudicialReasoning,23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
396Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudencefrom Bentham to
Hohfeld, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 975, 987 (1982) ("Legal rights, according to Hohfeld, are not merely
advantages conferred by the state on individuals. Any time the state confers an advantage on some
citizen, it necessarily simultaneously creates a vulnerability on the part of others. Legal rights are not
simply entitlements, but jural relations. Correlatives express a single legal relation from the point of
view of the two parties. '[I]f X has a right against Y that he shall stay off the former's land, the
correlative (and equivalent) is that Y is under a duty toward X to stay off the place."').
"I Id. ("[P]rivileges are the correlatives of no-rights. 'Whereas X has a rightor claim that Y, the
other man, should stay off the land, he himself has the privilegeof entering on the land; or in equivalent
words, X does not have a duty to stay off.' If A has no duty toward B, A has a privilege to act and B
has no right against A. Thus, if A has the privilege to do certain acts or to refrain from doing those acts,
B is vulnerable to the effects of A's actions. B cannot summon the aid of the state to prevent A from
acting in such a manner no matter how A's actions affect B's interests.").
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valuable than the robot, subject always to the reasonable imperfections of
the victim's ability to discern the relative values. Thus, the robot's right is
to not be damaged in order to save clearly less valuable property.
Privacy is more complicated still. First, although we suggest that
intrusion on seclusion should give rise to a privilege of self-help, the
question is not free of all doubt. Assuming there is a self-help privilege,
there are still the twin problems of valuation and detection. Not only are
robots hard to value, but so too are many forms of privacy. Worse, at
present, it is nearly impossible for the reasonable person to tell if a robot
that enters her property is collecting images, seeking local Wi-Fi or other
data, or if it might be about to do so. If it is really the case that a reasonable
person will be justified in suspecting any robot that is hovering nearby (or
maybe that has been hovering for some time) of seeking to invade her
privacy, then the conclusion is that trespassing robots have no rights at all
until and unless they do something to demonstrate that they are not a threat
to privacy.
Finally, we note that even when a person unjustly attacks a robot, the
robot has no privilege, much less a right, to harm a person in its own
defense. In this sense, Isaac Asimov predicted at least one law of robotics
completely accurately.

